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docs: update security policy and add CVE info (#24769)
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docs/docs/security/_category_.json
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{
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"label": "Security",
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"position": 10
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}
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docs/docs/security/cves.mdx
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---
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title: CVEs by release
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hide_title: true
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sidebar_position: 2
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---
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#### Version 2.1.0
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| CVE | Title | Affected |
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| :------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- | -----------------:|
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| CVE-2023-25504 | Possible SSRF on import datasets | <= 2.1.0 |
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| CVE-2023-27524 | Session validation vulnerability when using provided default SECRET_KEY | <= 2.1.0 |
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| CVE-2023-27525 | Incorrect default permissions for Gamma role | <= 2.1.0 |
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| CVE-2023-30776 | Database connection password leak | <= 2.1.0 |
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#### Version 2.0.1
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| CVE | Title | Affected |
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| :------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------- | -----------------:|
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| CVE-2022-41703 | SQL injection vulnerability in adhoc clauses | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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| CVE-2022-43717 | Cross-Site Scripting on dashboards | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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| CVE-2022-43718 | Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability on upload forms | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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| CVE-2022-43719 | Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) on accept, request access | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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| CVE-2022-43720 | Improper rendering of user input | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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| CVE-2022-43721 | Open Redirect Vulnerability | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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| CVE-2022-45438 | Dashboard metadata information leak | < 2.0.1 or <1.5.2 |
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docs/docs/security/security.mdx
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---
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title: Role based Access
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hide_title: true
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sidebar_position: 1
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---
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### Roles
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Security in Superset is handled by Flask AppBuilder (FAB), an application development framework
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built on top of Flask. FAB provides authentication, user management, permissions and roles.
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Please read its [Security documentation](https://flask-appbuilder.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security.html).
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### Provided Roles
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Superset ships with a set of roles that are handled by Superset itself. You can assume
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that these roles will stay up-to-date as Superset evolves (and as you update Superset versions).
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Even though **Admin** users have the ability, we don't recommend altering the
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permissions associated with each role (e.g. by removing or adding permissions to them). The permissions
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associated with each role will be re-synchronized to their original values when you run
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the **superset init** command (often done between Superset versions).
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A table with the permissions for these roles can be found at [/RESOURCES/STANDARD_ROLES.md](https://github.com/apache/superset/blob/master/RESOURCES/STANDARD_ROLES.md).
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### Admin
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Admins have all possible rights, including granting or revoking rights from other
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users and altering other people’s slices and dashboards.
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### Alpha
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Alpha users have access to all data sources, but they cannot grant or revoke access
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from other users. They are also limited to altering the objects that they own. Alpha users can add and alter data sources.
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### Gamma
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Gamma users have limited access. They can only consume data coming from data sources
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they have been given access to through another complementary role. They only have access to
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view the slices and dashboards made from data sources that they have access to. Currently Gamma
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users are not able to alter or add data sources. We assume that they are mostly content consumers, though they can create slices and dashboards.
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Also note that when Gamma users look at the dashboards and slices list view, they will
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only see the objects that they have access to.
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### sql_lab
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The **sql_lab** role grants access to SQL Lab. Note that while **Admin** users have access
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to all databases by default, both **Alpha** and **Gamma** users need to be given access on a per database basis.
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### Public
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To allow logged-out users to access some Superset features, you can use the `PUBLIC_ROLE_LIKE` config setting and assign it to another role whose permissions you want passed to this role.
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For example, by setting `PUBLIC_ROLE_LIKE = "Gamma"` in your `superset_config.py` file, you grant
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public role the same set of permissions as for the **Gamma** role. This is useful if one
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wants to enable anonymous users to view dashboards. Explicit grant on specific datasets is
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still required, meaning that you need to edit the **Public** role and add the public data sources to the role manually.
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### Managing Data Source Access for Gamma Roles
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Here’s how to provide users access to only specific datasets. First make sure the users with
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limited access have [only] the Gamma role assigned to them. Second, create a new role (Menu -> Security -> List Roles) and click the + sign.
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This new window allows you to give this new role a name, attribute it to users and select the
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tables in the **Permissions** dropdown. To select the data sources you want to associate with this role, simply click on the dropdown and use the typeahead to search for your table names.
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You can then confirm with users assigned to the **Gamma** role that they see the
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objects (dashboards and slices) associated with the tables you just extended them.
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### Customizing Permissions
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The permissions exposed by FAB are very granular and allow for a great level of
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customization. FAB creates many permissions automagically for each model that is
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created (can_add, can_delete, can_show, can_edit, …) as well as for each view.
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On top of that, Superset can expose more granular permissions like **all_datasource_access**.
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**We do not recommend altering the 3 base roles as there are a set of assumptions that
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Superset is built upon**. It is possible though for you to create your own roles, and union them to existing ones.
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### Permissions
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Roles are composed of a set of permissions, and Superset has many categories of
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permissions. Here are the different categories of permissions:
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- Model & Action: models are entities like Dashboard, Slice, or User. Each model has
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a fixed set of permissions, like **can_edit**, **can_show**, **can_delete**, **can_list**, **can_add**,
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and so on. For example, you can allow a user to delete dashboards by adding **can_delete** on
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Dashboard entity to a role and granting this user that role.
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- Views: views are individual web pages, like the Explore view or the SQL Lab view.
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When granted to a user, they will see that view in its menu items, and be able to load that page.
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- Data source: For each data source, a permission is created. If the user does not have the
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`all_datasource_access permission` granted, the user will only be able to see Slices or explore the data sources that are granted to them
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- Database: Granting access to a database allows for the user to access all
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data sources within that database, and will enable the user to query that
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database in SQL Lab, provided that the SQL Lab specific permission have been granted to the user
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### Restricting Access to a Subset of Data Sources
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We recommend giving a user the **Gamma** role plus any other roles that would add
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access to specific data sources. We recommend that you create individual roles for
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each access profile. For example, the users on the Finance team might have access to a set of
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databases and data sources; these permissions can be consolidated in a single role.
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Users with this profile then need to be assigned the **Gamma** role as a foundation to
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the models and views they can access, and that Finance role that is a collection of permissions to data objects.
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A user can have multiple roles associated with them. For example, an executive on the Finance
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team could be granted **Gamma**, **Finance**, and the **Executive** roles. The **Executive**
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role could provide access to a set of data sources and dashboards made available only to executives.
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In the **Dashboards** view, a user can only see the ones they have access too
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based on the roles and permissions that were attributed.
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### Row Level Security
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Using Row Level Security filters (under the **Security** menu) you can create filters
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that are assigned to a particular table, as well as a set of roles.
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If you want members of the Finance team to only have access to
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rows where `department = "finance"`, you could:
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- Create a Row Level Security filter with that clause (`department = "finance"`)
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- Then assign the clause to the **Finance** role and the table it applies to
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The **clause** field, which can contain arbitrary text, is then added to the generated
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SQL statement’s WHERE clause. So you could even do something like create a filter
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for the last 30 days and apply it to a specific role, with a clause
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like `date_field > DATE_SUB(NOW(), INTERVAL 30 DAY)`. It can also support
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multiple conditions: `client_id = 6` AND `advertiser="foo"`, etc.
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All relevant Row level security filters will be combined together (under the hood,
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the different SQL clauses are combined using AND statements). This means it's
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possible to create a situation where two roles conflict in such a way as to limit a table subset to empty.
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For example, the filters `client_id=4` and `client_id=5`, applied to a role,
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will result in users of that role having `client_id=4` AND `client_id=5`
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added to their query, which can never be true.
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### User Sessions
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Superset uses [Flask](https://pypi.org/project/Flask/)
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and [Flask-Login](https://pypi.org/project/Flask-Login/) for user session management.
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Session cookies are used to maintain session info and user state between requests,
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although they do not contain personal user information they serve the purpose of identifying
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a user session on the server side.
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The session cookie is encrypted with the application `SECRET_KEY` and cannot be read by the client.
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So it's very important to keep the `SECRET_KEY` secret and set to a secure unique complex random value.
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Flask and Flask-Login offer a number of configuration options to control session behavior.
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- Relevant Flask settings:
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`SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY`: (default: `False`): Controls if cookies should be set with the `HttpOnly` flag.
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`SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE`: (default: `False`) Browsers will only send cookies with requests over
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HTTPS if the cookie is marked “secure”. The application must be served over HTTPS for this to make sense.
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`SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE`: (default: "Lax") Prevents the browser from sending this cookie along with cross-site requests.
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`PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME`: (default: "31 days") The lifetime of a permanent session as a `datetime.timedelta` object.
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### Content Security Policy (CSP)
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Superset uses the [Talisman](https://pypi.org/project/flask-talisman/) extension to enable implementation of a
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[Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP), an added
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layer of security that helps to detect and mitigate certain types of attacks, including
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Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and data injection attacks.
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A CSP makes it possible for server administrators to reduce or eliminate the vectors by which XSS can
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occur by specifying the domains that the browser should consider to be valid sources of executable scripts.
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A CSP-compatible browser will then only execute scripts loaded in source files received from those allowed domains,
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ignoring all other scripts (including inline scripts and event-handling HTML attributes).
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A policy is described using a series of policy directives, each of which describes the policy for
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a certain resource type or policy area. You can check possible directives
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[here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy).
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It's extremely important to correctly configure a Content Security Policy when deploying Superset to
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prevent many types of attacks. Superset provides two variables in `config.py` for deploying a CSP:
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- `TALISMAN_ENABLED` defaults to `True`; set this to `False` in order to disable CSP
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- `TALISMAN_CONFIG` holds the actual the policy definition (*see example below*) as well as any
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other arguments to be passed to Talisman.
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When running in production mode, Superset will check at startup for the presence
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of a CSP. If one is not found, it will issue a warning with the security risks. For environments
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where CSP policies are defined outside of Superset using other software, administrators can disable
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this warning using the `CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY_WARNING` key in `config.py`.
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#### CSP Requirements
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* Superset needs the `style-src unsafe-inline` CSP directive in order to operate.
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```
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style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
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```
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* Only scripts marked with a [nonce](https://content-security-policy.com/nonce/) can be loaded and executed.
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Nonce is a random string automatically generated by Talisman on each page load.
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You can get current nonce value by calling jinja macro `csp_nonce()`.
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```
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<script nonce="{{ csp_nonce() }}">
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/* my script */
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</script>
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```
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- Some dashboards load images using data URIs and require `data:` in their `img-src`
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```
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img-src 'self' data:
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```
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- MapBox charts use workers and need to connect to MapBox servers in addition to the Superset origin
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```
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worker-src 'self' blob:
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connect-src 'self' https://api.mapbox.com https://events.mapbox.com
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```
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* Other CSP directives default to `'self'` to limit content to the same origin as the Superset server.
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In order to adjust provided CSP configuration to your needs, follow the instructions and examples provided in
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[Content Security Policy Reference](https://content-security-policy.com/)
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#### Other Talisman security considerations
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Setting `TALISMAN_ENABLED = True` will invoke Talisman's protection with its default arguments,
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of which `content_security_policy` is only one. Those can be found in the
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[Talisman documentation](https://pypi.org/project/flask-talisman/) under _Options_.
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These generally improve security, but administrators should be aware of their existence.
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In particular, the option of `force_https = True` (`False` by default) may break Superset's Alerts & Reports
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if workers are configured to access charts via a `WEBDRIVER_BASEURL` beginning
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with `http://`. As long as a Superset deployment enforces https upstream, e.g.,
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through a loader balancer or application gateway, it should be acceptable to keep this
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option disabled. Otherwise, you may want to enable `force_https` like this:
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```python
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TALISMAN_CONFIG = {
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"force_https": True,
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"content_security_policy": { ...
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```
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### Reporting Security Vulnerabilities
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Apache Software Foundation takes a rigorous standpoint in annihilating the security issues in its
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software projects. Apache Superset is highly sensitive and forthcoming to issues pertaining to its
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features and functionality.
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If you have apprehensions regarding Superset security or you discover vulnerability or potential
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threat, don’t hesitate to get in touch with the Apache Security Team by dropping a mail at
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security@apache.org. In the mail, specify the project name Superset with the description of the
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issue or potential threat. You are also urged to recommend the way to reproduce and replicate the
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issue. The security team and the Superset community will get back to you after assessing and
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analysing the findings.
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PLEASE PAY ATTENTION to report the security issue on the security email before disclosing it on
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public domain. The ASF Security Team maintains a page with the description of how vulnerabilities
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and potential threats are handled, check their web page for more details.
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