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superset2/superset/reports/notifications/webhook.py
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# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
# distributed with this work for additional information
# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
# software distributed under the License is distributed on an
# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
# specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
import ipaddress
import logging
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import backoff
import requests
from flask import current_app
from requests.adapters import HTTPAdapter
from urllib3.connection import HTTPConnection, HTTPSConnection
from urllib3.connectionpool import HTTPConnectionPool, HTTPSConnectionPool
from superset import feature_flag_manager
from superset.reports.models import ReportRecipientType
from superset.reports.notifications.base import BaseNotification
from superset.reports.notifications.exceptions import (
NotificationParamException,
NotificationUnprocessableException,
)
from superset.utils import json
from superset.utils.decorators import statsd_gauge
from superset.utils.network import is_safe_host, is_safe_ip
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Number of characters of a failing response body kept in the server-side log
# line. Response bodies are never folded into the exception message raised
# back to the caller -- that message is persisted verbatim as
# ``ReportExecutionLog.error_message`` and readable via the execution log
# API, which would otherwise turn the webhook target into a readback oracle
# for whatever it chooses to return (including an internal host reached via
# DNS rebinding).
_LOGGED_RESPONSE_BODY_LIMIT = 500
def _sanitize_for_log(text: str) -> str:
"""
Escape newlines and other control characters in text that gets embedded
in a log line. The webhook target controls the response body verbatim,
so logging it unescaped would let it forge additional log records or
corrupt line-oriented log ingestion.
"""
return text.translate(
{c: f"\\x{c:02x}" for c in [*range(0x20), 0x7F] if c not in (0x09,)}
)
def _raise_for_unsafe_peer(conn: HTTPConnection) -> None:
"""
Validate that a connection's actual peer is publicly routable.
``_validate_webhook_url`` resolves and checks the hostname once, ahead of
time; the connection opened here is resolved independently and may reach
a different address (DNS rebinding via a low-TTL record), so the check
has to be repeated against the address actually connected to.
"""
sock = conn.sock
if sock is None:
return
peer = sock.getpeername()[0]
if not is_safe_ip(ipaddress.ip_address(peer)):
raise NotificationParamException("Webhook URL target host is not allowed.")
class _PeerValidatingHTTPConnection(HTTPConnection):
"""HTTP connection that validates the peer address on connect."""
def connect(self) -> None:
super().connect()
_raise_for_unsafe_peer(self)
class _PeerValidatingHTTPSConnection(HTTPSConnection):
"""HTTPS connection that validates the peer address after the handshake."""
def connect(self) -> None:
super().connect()
_raise_for_unsafe_peer(self)
class _PeerValidatingHTTPConnectionPool(HTTPConnectionPool):
ConnectionCls = _PeerValidatingHTTPConnection
class _PeerValidatingHTTPSConnectionPool(HTTPSConnectionPool):
ConnectionCls = _PeerValidatingHTTPSConnection
class _PeerValidatingHTTPAdapter(HTTPAdapter):
"""
Transport adapter that routes requests through connection classes which
validate the connected peer address, closing the TOCTOU window between
the hostname check in ``_validate_webhook_url`` and the connection that
``send()`` actually opens.
Mirrors the peer-validation approach used for dataset-import data URIs
(``superset.commands.dataset.importers.v1.utils``), adapted to
``requests``/``urllib3`` connection pooling instead of ``urllib``.
"""
def init_poolmanager(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
super().init_poolmanager(*args, **kwargs)
# Assign a new dict rather than mutating the manager's dict in
# place -- the attribute otherwise aliases urllib3's module-global
# default scheme-to-pool-class mapping.
self.poolmanager.pool_classes_by_scheme = {
"http": _PeerValidatingHTTPConnectionPool,
"https": _PeerValidatingHTTPSConnectionPool,
}
def _get_requester() -> Any:
"""
Return the object used to issue the webhook POST -- either the
``requests`` module itself or a ``requests.Session``, both of which
expose a compatible ``.post(url, ...)``.
Operators who explicitly opt into internal webhook targets via
``ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_HOSTS`` get the plain ``requests``
module (no peer pinning -- internal hosts are the intended destination).
Otherwise a session is returned whose transport pins the connection to
the address that was actually validated.
"""
if current_app.config["ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_HOSTS"]:
return requests
session = requests.Session()
adapter = _PeerValidatingHTTPAdapter()
session.mount("http://", adapter)
session.mount("https://", adapter)
return session
class WebhookNotification(BaseNotification):
"""
Sends a post request to a webhook url
"""
type = ReportRecipientType.WEBHOOK
def _get_webhook_url(self) -> str:
"""
Get the webhook URL from the recipient configuration
:returns: The webhook URL
:raises NotificationParamException: If the webhook URL is not provided in the recipient configuration
""" # noqa: E501
try:
cfg = json.loads(self._recipient.recipient_config_json)
target = cfg.get("target") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else None
if not target:
raise NotificationParamException("Webhook URL is required")
return target
except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError) as ex:
raise NotificationParamException("Webhook URL is required") from ex
def _get_req_payload(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
header_content = {
"notification_format": self._content.header_data.get("notification_format"),
"notification_type": self._content.header_data.get("notification_type"),
"notification_source": self._content.header_data.get("notification_source"),
"chart_id": self._content.header_data.get("chart_id"),
"dashboard_id": self._content.header_data.get("dashboard_id"),
}
content = {
"name": self._content.name,
"header": header_content,
"text": self._content.text,
"description": self._content.description,
"url": self._content.url,
}
return content
def _get_files(self) -> list[tuple[str, tuple[str, bytes, str]]]:
files = []
if self._content.csv:
files.append(("files", ("report.csv", self._content.csv, "text/csv")))
if self._content.xlsx:
files.append(
(
"files",
(
"report.xlsx",
self._content.xlsx,
"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument."
"spreadsheetml.sheet",
),
)
)
if self._content.pdf:
files.append(
("files", ("report.pdf", self._content.pdf, "application/pdf"))
)
if self._content.screenshots:
for i, screenshot in enumerate(self._content.screenshots):
files.append(
(
"files",
(f"screenshot_{i}.png", screenshot, "image/png"),
)
)
return files
def _validate_webhook_url(self, url: str) -> None:
"""
Validate the webhook target URL before dispatch.
Checks that the scheme is HTTP(S) (and HTTPS when required by config),
that a hostname is present, and, unless the operator opts out via
``ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_HOSTS``, that the host does not
resolve to a private/internal address.
:raises NotificationParamException: if any of the above checks fail.
"""
parsed = urlparse(url)
scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
if scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise NotificationParamException(
"Webhook failed: only HTTP and HTTPS webhook URLs are supported."
)
if current_app.config["ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_HTTPS_ONLY"] and scheme != "https":
raise NotificationParamException(
"Webhook failed: HTTPS is required by config for webhook URLs."
)
if not parsed.hostname:
raise NotificationParamException(
"Webhook failed: URL must include a valid hostname."
)
# Operators with internal webhook targets (chatops bridges, internal
# automation, etc.) can opt out of the private-IP block via
# ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_HOSTS.
if current_app.config["ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_HOSTS"]:
return
if not is_safe_host(parsed.hostname):
raise NotificationParamException("Webhook URL target host is not allowed.")
@backoff.on_exception(
backoff.expo,
NotificationUnprocessableException,
factor=10,
base=2,
max_tries=5,
# Bound total wall-clock retry time. Without max_time, a hanging or
# persistently-failing target can stall a worker for minutes per bad
# URL, starving sequential report dispatch.
#
# backoff (see backoff._sync.retry_exception) samples elapsed at the
# start of each attempt and checks it against max_time only after that
# attempt fails -- so the giveup decision uses the time measured before
# the attempt ran, ignoring the attempt's own duration. With each
# request carrying the ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT (default 60s), a
# third attempt can begin past the 120s mark (its start gated by the
# prior check, which still saw ~60-70s) and then run its full request
# timeout before the check trips. The loop therefore makes 3 attempts:
# total wall-clock can exceed 120s by up to one request timeout plus
# jitter sleeps (<=10s then <=20s). factor is kept at 10 so
# legitimately-transient 5xx targets are not abandoned early.
max_time=120,
)
@statsd_gauge("reports.webhook.send")
def send(self) -> None:
if not feature_flag_manager.is_feature_enabled("ALERT_REPORT_WEBHOOK"):
raise NotificationUnprocessableException(
"Attempted to send a Webhook notification but Webhook feature flag \
is not enabled."
)
wh_url = self._get_webhook_url()
self._validate_webhook_url(wh_url)
payload = self._get_req_payload()
files = self._get_files()
timeout = current_app.config["ALERT_REPORTS_WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT"]
requester = _get_requester()
try:
if files:
data = {}
for key, value in payload.items():
if isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
data[key] = json.dumps(value)
else:
data[key] = value
response = requester.post(
wh_url,
data=data,
files=files,
timeout=timeout,
allow_redirects=False,
)
else:
response = requester.post(
wh_url, json=payload, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False
)
logger.info(
"Webhook sent to %s, status code: %s", wh_url, response.status_code
)
if response.status_code >= 500 or response.status_code == 429:
# The response body is logged server-side only (and
# truncated) -- it must not be folded into the exception
# message, which is persisted as the report execution log's
# error message and surfaced back to whoever can read that
# log, turning the webhook target into a readback oracle.
logger.warning(
"Webhook to %s failed with status code %s: %s",
wh_url,
response.status_code,
_sanitize_for_log(response.text[:_LOGGED_RESPONSE_BODY_LIMIT]),
)
raise NotificationUnprocessableException(
f"Webhook failed with status code {response.status_code}"
)
if response.status_code >= 400:
logger.warning(
"Webhook to %s failed with status code %s: %s",
wh_url,
response.status_code,
_sanitize_for_log(response.text[:_LOGGED_RESPONSE_BODY_LIMIT]),
)
raise NotificationParamException(
f"Webhook failed with status code {response.status_code}"
)
if response.status_code >= 300:
# Redirects are intentionally not followed (allow_redirects=False),
# so a 3xx means the request never reached the final target. Treat
# it as a failure rather than silently reporting success.
raise NotificationParamException(
f"Webhook returned an unfollowed redirect "
f"(status code {response.status_code})"
)
except requests.exceptions.RequestException as ex:
raise NotificationUnprocessableException(str(ex)) from ex