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superset2/superset/extensions/ssh.py
2026-06-23 09:15:45 -07:00

268 lines
11 KiB
Python

# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
# distributed with this work for additional information
# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
# software distributed under the License is distributed on an
# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
# specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.
import base64
import binascii
import logging
import socket
from io import StringIO
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
import paramiko
import sshtunnel
from flask import Flask
from paramiko import (
ECDSAKey,
Ed25519Key,
PasswordRequiredException,
PKey,
RSAKey,
SSHException,
)
from paramiko.pkey import UnknownKeyType
from superset.commands.database.ssh_tunnel.exceptions import (
SSHTunnelDatabasePortError,
SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError,
)
from superset.databases.utils import make_url_safe
from superset.utils.class_utils import load_class_from_name
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from superset.databases.ssh_tunnel.models import SSHTunnel
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Order matters: paramiko's per-class loaders raise SSHException with vague
# "unpack requires 4 bytes" messages on type mismatches, so we try the more
# modern key types first (ed25519, ECDSA) and fall back to RSA, which is the
# most permissive parser and the historical default in this codebase.
_SSH_KEY_TYPES: tuple[type[PKey], ...] = (Ed25519Key, ECDSAKey, RSAKey)
def _load_private_key(pem: str, password: str | None) -> PKey:
"""Load a private key PEM regardless of algorithm (ed25519, ECDSA, RSA).
paramiko 3.2+ has ``PKey.from_path()`` for polymorphic loading, but it
requires a filesystem path; writing private key material to disk would be a
security regression. Each per-class loader only accepts its own format, so
iterate over the supported types on the in-memory ``StringIO`` and return
the first that parses cleanly.
"""
last_exc: SSHException | None = None
for key_class in _SSH_KEY_TYPES:
try:
return key_class.from_private_key(StringIO(pem), password=password)
except PasswordRequiredException:
raise
except SSHException as exc:
last_exc = exc
# NOTE: last_exc holds the error from the final attempt (RSAKey), not the
# closest-matching type. For a corrupted ed25519 key, the appended message
# reflects RSAKey's parse error; the full type list above still identifies
# all types attempted.
raise SSHException(
"Unable to parse SSH private key as any of "
f"{', '.join(k.__name__ for k in _SSH_KEY_TYPES)}: {last_exc}"
) from last_exc
def _parse_authorized_key(authorized_key: str) -> paramiko.PKey:
"""
Parse a host key in authorized-key form (``"<type> <base64>[ comment]"``) into a
:class:`paramiko.PKey`. The optional trailing comment field and surrounding
whitespace are ignored.
:raises ValueError: if the value is empty or cannot be parsed as a host key.
"""
fields = authorized_key.strip().split()
if len(fields) < 2:
raise ValueError("Host key must be in 'ssh-<type> <base64>' form")
key_type, key_b64 = fields[0], fields[1]
try:
# validate=True so malformed characters raise instead of being silently
# dropped, which could otherwise pin an unintended key value.
key_bytes = base64.b64decode(key_b64, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError) as ex:
raise ValueError("Host key base64 payload could not be decoded") from ex
try:
return paramiko.PKey.from_type_string(key_type, key_bytes)
except (paramiko.SSHException, UnknownKeyType) as ex:
raise ValueError(f"Host key could not be parsed: {ex}") from ex
class SSHManager:
def __init__(self, app: Flask) -> None:
super().__init__()
self.local_bind_address = app.config["SSH_TUNNEL_LOCAL_BIND_ADDRESS"]
self.strict_host_key_checking = app.config.get(
"SSH_TUNNEL_STRICT_HOST_KEY_CHECKING", False
)
sshtunnel.TUNNEL_TIMEOUT = app.config["SSH_TUNNEL_TIMEOUT_SEC"]
sshtunnel.SSH_TIMEOUT = app.config["SSH_TUNNEL_PACKET_TIMEOUT_SEC"]
def build_sqla_url(
self, sqlalchemy_url: str, server: sshtunnel.SSHTunnelForwarder
) -> str:
# override any ssh tunnel configuration object
url = make_url_safe(sqlalchemy_url)
return url.set(
host=server.local_bind_address[0],
port=server.local_bind_port,
)
def _verify_host_key(self, ssh_tunnel: "SSHTunnel") -> "paramiko.PKey | None":
"""
Opt-in defense-in-depth: verify the SSH server's host key before opening the
tunnel, to resist man-in-the-middle attacks (paramiko's ``Transport`` does no
known-hosts checking by default).
Behavior:
- If the tunnel declares an expected ``server_host_key``, connect to the SSH
server, read the host key it presents, and compare. On mismatch (or if the
expected key cannot be parsed) raise
:class:`SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError`.
- If no expected key is set and ``SSH_TUNNEL_STRICT_HOST_KEY_CHECKING`` is
enabled, fail closed and raise.
- If no expected key is set and strict checking is disabled, do nothing,
preserving existing (unverified) behavior.
:returns: the parsed expected host key when one is configured (so the caller
can pin it on the tunnel's own connection), or ``None`` when no key is
configured.
"""
expected_raw = ssh_tunnel.server_host_key
if not expected_raw or not expected_raw.strip():
if self.strict_host_key_checking:
raise SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError(
message=(
"SSH_TUNNEL_STRICT_HOST_KEY_CHECKING is enabled but no "
"expected server host key is configured for this tunnel."
)
)
return None
try:
expected_key = _parse_authorized_key(expected_raw)
except ValueError as ex:
raise SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError(
message=f"The configured expected server host key is invalid: {ex}"
) from ex
# Build the socket ourselves with an explicit timeout so the TCP connect
# phase is bounded too. ``paramiko.Transport((host, port))`` would connect
# synchronously with no timeout, leaving ``start_client(timeout=...)`` to
# govern only the SSH handshake; an unreachable host could then block for the
# full OS-level TCP timeout.
try:
sock = socket.create_connection(
(ssh_tunnel.server_address, ssh_tunnel.server_port),
timeout=sshtunnel.SSH_TIMEOUT,
)
except OSError as ex:
raise SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError(
message=f"Could not connect to the SSH server: {ex}"
) from ex
transport = paramiko.Transport(sock)
try:
transport.start_client(timeout=sshtunnel.SSH_TIMEOUT)
remote_key = transport.get_remote_server_key()
except Exception as ex: # noqa: BLE001
raise SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError(
message=f"Could not retrieve the SSH server host key: {ex}"
) from ex
finally:
transport.close()
if remote_key != expected_key:
logger.warning(
"SSH host key mismatch for %s:%s",
ssh_tunnel.server_address,
ssh_tunnel.server_port,
)
raise SSHTunnelHostKeyVerificationError(
message=(
"The SSH server presented a host key that does not match the "
"expected server host key configured for this tunnel."
)
)
return expected_key
def create_tunnel(
self,
ssh_tunnel: "SSHTunnel",
sqlalchemy_database_uri: str,
) -> sshtunnel.SSHTunnelForwarder:
# Deferred import to break a circular import:
# superset.utils.ssh_tunnel -> superset.databases.ssh_tunnel.models
# -> superset.extensions -> superset.extensions.ssh (this module).
from superset.utils.ssh_tunnel import get_default_port
url = make_url_safe(sqlalchemy_database_uri)
backend = url.get_backend_name()
port = url.port or get_default_port(backend)
if not port:
raise SSHTunnelDatabasePortError()
# Opt-in host-key verification runs before the tunnel is opened. It returns
# the parsed expected key (or None) so we can also pin it on the tunnel's own
# connection below.
expected_host_key = self._verify_host_key(ssh_tunnel)
params = {
"ssh_address_or_host": (ssh_tunnel.server_address, ssh_tunnel.server_port),
"ssh_username": ssh_tunnel.username,
"remote_bind_address": (url.host, port),
"local_bind_address": (self.local_bind_address,),
"debug_level": logging.getLogger("flask_appbuilder").level,
}
if expected_host_key is not None:
# Pin the expected key on the tunnel's own connection, so paramiko verifies
# the host that actually carries traffic on the same transport. The probe
# above and the tunnel open separate connections, so verifying only the
# probe would leave a TOCTOU gap (DNS re-resolution, selective
# interception); pinning here closes it.
params["ssh_host_key"] = expected_host_key
if ssh_tunnel.password:
params["ssh_password"] = ssh_tunnel.password
elif ssh_tunnel.private_key:
params["ssh_pkey"] = _load_private_key(
ssh_tunnel.private_key, ssh_tunnel.private_key_password
)
return sshtunnel.open_tunnel(**params)
class SSHManagerFactory:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._ssh_manager = None
def init_app(self, app: Flask) -> None:
self._ssh_manager = load_class_from_name(
app.config["SSH_TUNNEL_MANAGER_CLASS"]
)(app)
@property
def instance(self) -> SSHManager:
return self._ssh_manager # type: ignore