* feat(snaptrade): replace device-flow OAuth with authorization-code + PKCE flow
Squashed from 16 commits on snaptrade-oauth-apps for a clean rebase onto
current upstream/main ahead of opening a PR.
* fix(snaptrade): address PR #2747 review feedback on OAuth PKCE flow
- Remove unreachable dead-code guard in import_latest_snaptrade_data
- Guard apply_oauth_tokens! against a malformed payload missing access_token
- Wrap token endpoint network errors in ApiError and retry like data calls
- Remove unused Provider::Snaptrade#revoke_token! instance method
- Preserve return_to/accountable_type through the SnapTrade portal callback
so the account-linking flow no longer drops users back to accounts_path
- Show the real absolute OAuth callback URL in self-hosted setup instructions
- Refresh brakeman.ignore fingerprint for the connect redirect after the
return_to/accountable_type params were added
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y8SCCmKX6RphB5E73WSUQQ
* fix(snaptrade): don't retry non-idempotent OAuth/API requests
CodeRabbit flagged that Provider::Snaptrade retried OAuth token
exchanges/refreshes and all API POST/DELETE calls (get_connection_url,
delete_connection) after timeouts/connection failures. If the response
is lost after SnapTrade already consumed a single-use auth code,
rotated the refresh token, or applied a POST/DELETE, replaying the
request either fails with invalid_grant on a token that actually
succeeded, or risks duplicate side effects. Retries are now limited to
GET requests; OAuth token requests and non-GET API calls translate a
network failure straight into an ApiError without replay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NrrGkgSBEqhjjBmmH1fcXL
* fix(snaptrade): stop querying non-deterministically encrypted token via empty-string compare
CodeRabbit flagged that the syncable scope's where.not(oauth_access_token:
[nil, ""]) re-encrypts "" with a random IV on every query, so the ""
comparison can never match a stored ciphertext and is a silent no-op.
No code path ever persists oauth_access_token as "" (only nil or a real
token via apply_oauth_tokens!), so the exclusion is unnecessary --
narrowed the scope to a plain NULL check, which encryption handles
transparently since nil is never encrypted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NrrGkgSBEqhjjBmmH1fcXL
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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
