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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Guillem Arias Fauste
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344cf091e1 |
feat(auth): sign in with a passkey, without a password (#2911)
* feat(auth): sign in with a passkey, without a password Passkeys could only ever replace the TOTP code: registration required 2FA to already be on, and the WebAuthn ceremony was reachable only after User.authenticate_by had succeeded. A registered passkey can now complete sign-in on its own, from the login page. The ceremony requests userVerification: "required", so the authenticator has to confirm the person as well as the device. That makes a lone passkey two independent factors, the same bar as the password plus TOTP flow it replaces, which is why this path deliberately skips the TOTP step. A credential that can only prove presence is rejected here and still works as a second factor. Sign-in is usernameless: no email is submitted, because the browser returns the account handle with the assertion. Nothing on this path can be probed to learn whether an account exists. Registration now asks for a discoverable credential with residentKey: "preferred" so the key is offered by the picker, while authenticators without a free resident-key slot still register as a second factor. Where conditional mediation is available, saved passkeys appear in the email field's autofill menu; everywhere else the button covers it. The automatic challenge request that conditional mediation makes on every page load gets its own looser Rack::Attack budget, so ordinary page views can no longer exhaust the limit that protects the MFA endpoints. Set AUTH_PASSKEY_LOGIN_ENABLED=false to keep passkeys as a second factor only. Passkey sign-in follows the same policy as local login, so it stays closed to regular users when AUTH_LOCAL_LOGIN_ENABLED is false. * refactor(auth): group the passkey button with the other sign-in methods It sat directly under the password fields, so the forgot-password link split it from the identical SSO buttons. It is an alternative to the credential form rather than part of it. * fix(auth): close the passkey challenge races and document the upgrade Three review passes converged on the conditional-mediation flow. The AbortController was created after `isConditionalMediationAvailable()` resolved, so a button click or a Turbo disconnect landing in that window found nothing to abort: the conditional task carried on, re-minted the challenge, and the assertion the user was about to produce verified against a challenge the server had already replaced. It is created before the first await now, and held in a local, because `abortConditionalMediation()` nulls the field. Checking that one signal after each await covers both triggers, so no separate connected flag is needed. The same symptom had a second cause nobody flagged: `authenticate()` was not re-entrant. A double-click minted a fresh challenge under an open authenticator prompt and rejected a perfectly valid passkey, with no race window at all — and it was live on the MFA step-up too, which shares the method. The conditional catch was silent for every failure, including a rejected assertion the user had deliberately chosen from the autofill menu. Splitting the try draws the line where it belongs: silence before the user has been asked anything, feedback once they have picked a passkey. Filtering on `error.name` cannot draw it, since `fetchOptions` and `verifyCredential` both raise a plain Error. Also documents the upgrade: passwordless is on by default and applies to already-registered credentials, so a passkey added purely as a second factor can now sign its owner in alone. Nothing in the schema marks a credential discoverable — the authenticator decides — and the opt-out is instance-wide. The invitation test is a guard, not coverage for this change. The pending token lives in the Rack session and `complete_sign_in` reads it right after creating the session, so a `reset_session` dropped in between strands the invitee in their own family, silently and with every existing test still green. * fix(auth): cancel the in-flight conditional options request Aborting the conditional flow did not cancel its options request, because `fetchOptions` never received the signal. A click landing while that POST was in flight left it to finish, and its response could apply last. The challenge rides in the session cookie, so "the server wrote it" only counts if the Set-Cookie reaches the browser. Threading the signal means an aborted request's response is discarded, which closes the window without needing the server to hold two challenges open. Also drops the absolute claim about which existing credentials gain passwordless sign-in. `residentKey: "preferred"` is a request an authenticator may decline, and nothing records what it decided, so the honest statement is that password managers and platform authenticators generally store discoverable credentials rather than always. |
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Guillem Arias Fauste
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5c0a7d8cbd |
feat(settings): super-admin background jobs console (#2682)
* feat(settings): super-admin background jobs console Neither managed nor self-hosted production deployments have any view into background job state (/sidekiq is only mounted outside production), so a stuck sync, import, or export is invisible until a user complains — and even then there is no way to act on it. Adds /settings/background_jobs, gated by the same super-admin Admin::BaseController as /settings/debug: - Worker status header: Sidekiq processes, busy count, queue depths and latency, retry/scheduled/dead set sizes. Read through a fail-closed PORO (BackgroundJobConsole) — when Redis is unreachable the console says so and disables actions instead of pretending health (deliberate contrast to BackgroundJobHealth's fail-open). - In-flight operations across all families: incomplete Syncs, Imports importing/reverting, ImportSessions importing, FamilyExports pending/processing, each with a liveness verdict derived from Sidekiq::Workers (job GlobalIDs in running payloads). - One mutation: mark a presumed-lost operation as such (Sync → stale, Import → failed/revert_failed, PdfImport → claim released back to pending, ImportSession/FamilyExport → failed). Guard rails on the mutation, server-side re-checked: - refused while Redis state is unknown (fail closed) - refused while the record's job is visibly executing - refused until the record has been idle past 30 minutes, so a merely queued job cannot be shot down and then still run - refused for parent Syncs with children still in flight (a parent legitimately has no live job of its own while children run) - applied inside with_lock with a status re-check, so a job finishing between render and click wins - audited as a DebugLogEntry (actor, prior status, family) The cancel endpoint gets its own Rack Attack throttle since the console deliberately lives under /settings rather than the throttled /admin prefix (its 10 req/min limit would fight the page's polling). * fix(jobs-console): count waiting jobs as live and harden cancel paths Review feedback on #2682 (Codex, CodeRabbit): - Liveness now covers jobs sitting in queues, the retry set, and the scheduled set, not just visibly-executing workers — a job waiting out a backlog or retry backoff WILL run later, and most affected job classes don't abort on a flipped status, so cancelling invited duplicate work. The backlog scan is bounded (5k entries); a truncated scan fails closed like redis_error?. The liveness column shows "Queued" for these - find_record! resolves STI subclass names (TransactionImport, PdfImport, …) against a base-class whitelist via safe_constantize instead of a fixed name map, so non-UI callers naming the subclass don't 404 - A PdfImport stuck in reverting goes to revert_failed like every other import instead of being released to pending — pending presented a possibly half-reverted import as publishable again; only the AI extraction claim (importing) is released to pending - Redis-unreachable warning renders via DS::Alert; operation id cast to_s before splitting; admin-cancel error copy moved to i18n * fix(jobs-console): re-check the stuck window inside the cancel row lock CodeRabbit round-2: cancellable? evaluates Sidekiq liveness outside the with_lock transaction (re-running Redis calls under a row lock would be worse), so a worker picking the job up between the liveness check and the lock acquisition was invisible. Repeating the updated_at staleness check inside the lock closes that window — a freshly-started job touches the record, and the re-check refuses the cancel. * fix(jobs-console): resolve record_type without reflection, i18n nits Brakeman flagged safe_constantize on params[:record_type] as a High-confidence UnsafeReflection (ci/scan_ruby). Replace the constant lookup with a reverse lookup: find the id in each cancellable base table and require the claimed type to match the found record's class or its base class. STI subclass names still resolve; unknown types still 404. Also from DS Drift Patrol: - "Sync · " label in _operation.html.erb now goes through t(".sync_label", type:) - drop the redundant default: on background_jobs_label now that the key exists in the locale file |
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Will Wilson
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2075c8c41c |
feat(mcp): OAuth 2.1 auth for MCP — connect Claude.ai with your Sure login (#2234)
* feat(mcp): add OAuth well-known discovery endpoints (RFC 8414 + RFC 9728) Serves /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728) and /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (RFC 8414) so MCP clients can auto-discover the authorization server. Both endpoints are unauthenticated and respect APP_URL for reverse-proxy deployments. * feat(mcp): add dynamic client registration endpoint (RFC 7591) POST /register creates a public Doorkeeper::Application on demand so MCP clients (e.g. Claude.ai) can self-register without manual setup. Validates redirect_uris (including blank entries), falls back to "MCP Client" name, returns no client_secret (public client, PKCE only). Rate-limited to 10 registrations/min/IP via Rack::Attack. * feat(mcp): authenticate via Doorkeeper OAuth2, keep MCP_API_TOKEN as fallback MCP endpoint now accepts OAuth2 Bearer tokens issued by Doorkeeper. Falls back to the existing MCP_API_TOKEN env-var flow so self-hosted deployments are not broken. Requires MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED or MCP_API_TOKEN to be set — the endpoint returns 503 otherwise. - OauthBase concern provides APP_URL-aware configured_base_url (trailing slash stripped to prevent double-slash URLs) - Bearer scheme parsed case-insensitively (RFC 7235) - Only read_write scope accepted — read scope would allow mutating tools (CreateGoal, ImportBankStatement), so read-only tokens are rejected - Deactivated users rejected even with a valid Doorkeeper token - WWW-Authenticate header on 401 points to RFC 9728 resource metadata - SHA-256 digest used for constant-time env-var comparison - Rack::Attack throttle added for POST /register - Routes wired: /.well-known/*, /register, use_doorkeeper * fix(mcp): disable Turbo on OAuth consent form for external redirect URIs Turbo was intercepting the authorization form POST and XHR-fetching the redirect_uri (e.g. https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback), which CORS blocks. Extend the existing turbo_disabled guard to cover any redirect_uri that doesn't originate from the app itself. * feat(mcp): add Settings::McpController with connected clients view - Settings > MCP page (under Advanced) shows the MCP server URL with copy button and step-by-step instructions for connecting Claude.ai - Lists active non-mobile OAuth tokens with app name and revoke action; mobile device tokens are excluded to prevent accidental disconnection - Removes the MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED env-var gate — OAuth auth is always available since Doorkeeper handles consent; MCP_API_TOKEN remains as a self-hosted fallback * fix(mcp): remove client_credentials from grant_types_supported metadata Only authorization_code is supported by the registration endpoint. Advertising client_credentials was misleading — a client that reads the metadata and attempts that flow would get an application with the wrong grant type. |
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ghost
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911aa34ba9 |
feat(auth): add WebAuthn MFA credentials (#1628)
* feat(auth): add WebAuthn MFA credentials * fix(auth): harden WebAuthn MFA review paths * fix(auth): polish WebAuthn error handling * fix(auth): handle duplicate WebAuthn credential races * fix(auth): permit WebAuthn credential params * fix(auth): trim WebAuthn registration controller cleanup * fix(auth): tighten WebAuthn MFA handling * fix(auth): pin WebAuthn relying party config |
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d88c2151cb |
Add REST API for holdings and trades (Discussion #905) (#918)
* Add REST API for holdings and trades (Discussion #905) - Trades: GET index (filter by account_id, account_ids, start_date, end_date), GET show, POST create (buy/sell with security_id or ticker), PATCH update, DELETE destroy. Create restricted to accounts that support trades (investment or crypto exchange). Uses existing Trade::CreateForm for creation. - Holdings: GET index (filter by account_id, account_ids, date, start_date, end_date, security_id), GET show. Read-only; scoped to family. - Auth: read scope for index/show; write scope for create/update/destroy. - Responses: JSON via jbuilder (trade: id, date, amount, qty, price, account, security, category; holding: id, date, qty, price, amount, account, security, avg_cost). Pagination for index endpoints (page, per_page). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * API v1 holdings & trades: validation, docs, specs - Holdings: validate date params, return 400 for invalid dates (parse_date!) - Trades: validate start_date/end_date, return 422 for invalid dates - Trades: accept buy/sell and inflow/outflow in update (trade_sell_from_type_or_nature?) - Trades view: nil guard for trade.security - Trades apply_filters: single join(:entry) when filtering - OpenAPI: add Trade/TradeCollection schemas, ErrorResponse.errors - Add spec/requests/api/v1/holdings_spec.rb and trades_spec.rb (rswag) - Regenerate docs/api/openapi.yaml Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * CI: fix Brakeman and test rate-limit failures - Disable Rack::Attack in test (use existing enabled flag) so parallel API tests no longer hit 429 from shared api_ip throttle - Add Brakeman ignore for trades_controller trade_params mass-assignment (account_id/security_id validated in create/update) - Trades/holdings API and OpenAPI spec updates Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Trades: partial qty/price update fallback; fix PATCH OpenAPI schema - Fall back to existing trade qty/price when only one is supplied so sign normalisation and amount recalculation always run - OpenAPI: remove top-level qty, price, investment_activity_label, category_id from PATCH body; document entryable_attributes only Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Trades: fix update/DELETE OpenAPI and avoid sell-trade corruption - Only run qty/price normalisation when client sends qty or price; preserve existing trade direction when type/nature omitted - OpenAPI: remove duplicate PATCH path param; add 422 for PATCH; document DELETE 200 body (DeleteResponse) Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * API: flat trade update params, align holdings errors, spec/OpenAPI fixes - Trades update: accept flat params (qty, price, type, etc.), build entryable_attributes in build_entry_params_for_update (match transactions) - Holdings: ArgumentError → 422 validation_failed; parse_date!(value, name) with safe message; extract render_validation_error, log_and_render_error - Specs: path id required (trades, holdings); trades delete 200 DeleteResponse; remove holdings 500; trades update body flat; holdings 422 invalid date - OpenAPI: PATCH trade request body flat Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * OpenAPI: add 422 invalid date filter to holdings index Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * API consistency and RSwag doc-only fixes - Trades: use render_validation_error in all 4 validation paths; safe_per_page_param case/when - Holdings: set_holding to family.holdings.find; price as Money.format in API; safe_per_page_param case/when - Swagger: Holding qty/price descriptions (Quantity of shares held, Formatted price per share) - RSwag: trades delete and valuations 201 use bare run_test! (documentation only, no expect) Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix index-vs-show visibility inconsistencies and preserve custom activity labels - Add account status filter to set_holding to match index behavior - Add visible scope to set_trade to match index behavior - Preserve existing investment_activity_label when updating qty/price Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Trades: clearer validation for non-numeric qty/price Return 'must be valid numbers' when qty or price is non-numeric (e.g. abc) instead of misleading 'must be present and positive'. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: mkdev11 <jaysmth689+github@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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Juan José MataandClaude
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61ce5c8514 |
Protect demo API key from deletion (#919)
* feat: Protect demo monitoring API key from deletion - Add DEMO_MONITORING_KEY constant to ApiKey model - Add `demo_monitoring_key?` method to identify the monitoring key - Add `visible` scope to exclude monitoring key from UI queries - Update controller to use `visible` scope, hiding the monitoring key - Prevent revocation of the monitoring key with explicit error handling - Update Demo::Generator to use the shared constant Users on the demo instance can still create their own API keys, but cannot see or delete the monitoring key used for uptime checks. https://claude.ai/code/session_01RQFsw39K7PB5kztboVdBdB * Linter * Protect demo monitoring API key from deletion * Use monitoring source for demo API key * Add test for demo monitoring revoke guard * Disable Rack::Attack in test and development --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Josh Waldrep
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14993d871c |
feat: comprehensive SSO/OIDC upgrade with enterprise features
Multi-provider SSO support: - Database-backed SSO provider management with admin UI - Support for OpenID Connect, Google OAuth2, GitHub, and SAML 2.0 - Flipper feature flag (db_sso_providers) for dynamic provider loading - ProviderLoader service for YAML or database configuration Admin functionality: - Admin::SsoProvidersController for CRUD operations - Admin::UsersController for super_admin role management - Pundit policies for authorization - Test connection endpoint for validating provider config User provisioning improvements: - JIT (just-in-time) account creation with configurable default role - Changed default JIT role from admin to member (security) - User attribute sync on each SSO login - Group/role mapping from IdP claims SSO identity management: - Settings::SsoIdentitiesController for users to manage connected accounts - Issuer validation for OIDC identities - Unlink protection when no password set Audit logging: - SsoAuditLog model tracking login, logout, link, unlink, JIT creation - Captures IP address, user agent, and metadata Advanced OIDC features: - Custom scopes per provider - Configurable prompt parameter (login, consent, select_account, none) - RP-initiated logout (federated logout to IdP) - id_token storage for logout SAML 2.0 support: - omniauth-saml gem integration - IdP metadata URL or manual configuration - Certificate and fingerprint validation - NameID format configuration |
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Juliano Julio Costa
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3f92fe0f6f |
Relax API rate limits for self-hosted deployments (#2465)
- Introduced NoopApiRateLimiter to effectively disable API rate limiting for self-hosted mode. - Updated ApiRateLimiter to delegate to NoopApiRateLimiter when running self-hosted. - Increased Rack::Attack throttle limits significantly for self-hosted deployments. - Added tests for NoopApiRateLimiter to ensure correct behavior. - This allows self-hosted users to make more API requests without restriction, while keeping stricter limits for SaaS deployments. |
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Josh PigfordandClaude
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b803ddac96 |
Add comprehensive API v1 with OAuth and API key authentication (#2389)
* OAuth * Add API test routes and update Doorkeeper token handling for test environment - Introduced API namespace with test routes for controller testing in the test environment. - Updated Doorkeeper configuration to allow fallback to plain tokens in the test environment for easier testing. - Modified schema to change resource_owner_id type from bigint to string. * Implement API key authentication and enhance access control - Replaced Doorkeeper OAuth authentication with a custom method supporting both OAuth and API keys in the BaseController. - Added methods for API key authentication, including validation and logging. - Introduced scope-based authorization for API keys in the TestController. - Updated routes to include API key management endpoints. - Enhanced logging for API access to include authentication method details. - Added tests for API key functionality, including validation, scope checks, and access control enforcement. * Add API key rate limiting and usage tracking - Implemented rate limiting for API key authentication in BaseController. - Added methods to check rate limits, render appropriate responses, and include rate limit headers in responses. - Updated routes to include a new usage resource for tracking API usage. - Enhanced tests to verify rate limit functionality, including exceeding limits and per-key tracking. - Cleaned up Redis data in tests to ensure isolation between test cases. * Add Jbuilder for JSON rendering and refactor AccountsController - Added Jbuilder gem for improved JSON response handling. - Refactored index action in AccountsController to utilize Jbuilder for rendering JSON. - Removed manual serialization of accounts and streamlined response structure. - Implemented a before_action in BaseController to enforce JSON format for all API requests. * Add transactions resource to API routes - Added routes for transactions, allowing index, show, create, update, and destroy actions. - This enhancement supports comprehensive transaction management within the API. * Enhance API authentication and onboarding handling - Updated BaseController to skip onboarding requirements for API endpoints and added manual token verification for OAuth authentication. - Improved error handling and logging for invalid access tokens. - Introduced a method to set up the current context for API requests, ensuring compatibility with session-like behavior. - Excluded API paths from onboarding redirects in the Onboardable concern. - Updated database schema to change resource_owner_id type from bigint to string for OAuth access grants. * Fix rubocop offenses - Fix indentation and spacing issues - Convert single quotes to double quotes - Add spaces inside array brackets - Fix comment alignment - Add missing trailing newlines - Correct else/end alignment 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix API test failures and improve test reliability - Fix ApiRateLimiterTest by removing mock users method and using fixtures - Fix UsageControllerTest by removing mock users method and using fixtures - Fix BaseControllerTest by using different users for multiple API keys - Use unique display_key values with SecureRandom to avoid conflicts - Fix double render issue in UsageController by returning after authorize_scope\! - Specify controller name in routes for usage resource - Remove trailing whitespace and empty lines per Rubocop All tests now pass and linting is clean. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add API transactions controller warning to brakeman ignore The account_id parameter in the API transactions controller is properly validated on line 79: family.accounts.find(transaction_params[:account_id]) This ensures users can only create transactions in accounts belonging to their family, making this a false positive. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Josh Pigford <josh@joshpigford.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |