# Pipelock: AI Agent Security Proxy [Pipelock](https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock) is an optional security proxy that scans AI agent traffic flowing through Sure. It protects against secret exfiltration, prompt injection, and tool poisoning. ## What Pipelock does Pipelock runs as a separate proxy service alongside Sure with two listeners: | Listener | Port | Direction | What it scans | |----------|------|-----------|---------------| | Forward proxy | 8888 | Outbound (Sure to LLM) | DLP (secrets in prompts), response injection | | MCP reverse proxy | 8889 | Inbound (agent to Sure /mcp) | Prompt injection, tool poisoning, DLP | ### Forward proxy (outbound) When `HTTPS_PROXY=http://pipelock:8888` is set, outbound HTTPS requests from Faraday-based clients (like `ruby-openai`) are routed through Pipelock. It scans request bodies for leaked secrets and response bodies for prompt injection. **Covered:** OpenAI API calls via ruby-openai (uses Faraday). **Not covered:** SimpleFIN, Coinbase, Plaid, or anything using Net::HTTP/HTTParty directly. These bypass `HTTPS_PROXY`. ### MCP reverse proxy (inbound) External AI assistants that call Sure's `/mcp` endpoint should connect through Pipelock on port 8889 instead of directly to port 3000. Pipelock scans: - Tool call arguments (DLP, shell obfuscation detection) - Tool responses (injection payloads) - Session binding (detects tool inventory manipulation) - Tool call chains (multi-step attack patterns like recon then exfil) ## Docker Compose setup The `compose.example.ai.yml` file includes Pipelock. To use it: 1. Download the compose file and Pipelock config: ```bash curl -o compose.ai.yml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/we-promise/sure/main/compose.example.ai.yml curl -o pipelock.example.yaml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/we-promise/sure/main/pipelock.example.yaml ``` 2. Start the stack: ```bash docker compose -f compose.ai.yml up -d ``` 3. Verify Pipelock is healthy: ```bash docker compose -f compose.ai.yml ps pipelock # Should show "healthy" ``` ### Connecting external AI agents External agents should use the MCP reverse proxy port: ```text http://your-server:8889 ``` The agent must include the `MCP_API_TOKEN` as a Bearer token in requests. Set this in your `.env`: ```bash MCP_API_TOKEN=generate-a-random-token MCP_USER_EMAIL=your@email.com ``` ### Running without Pipelock To use `compose.example.ai.yml` without Pipelock, remove the `pipelock` service and its `depends_on` entries from `web` and `worker`, then unset the proxy env vars (`HTTPS_PROXY`, `HTTP_PROXY`). Or use the standard `compose.example.yml` which does not include Pipelock. ## Helm (Kubernetes) setup Enable Pipelock in your Helm values: ```yaml pipelock: enabled: true image: tag: "0.3.2" mode: balanced ``` This creates a separate Deployment, Service, and ConfigMap. The chart auto-injects `HTTPS_PROXY`/`HTTP_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` into web and worker pods. ### Exposing MCP to external agents (Kubernetes) In Kubernetes, external agents cannot reach the MCP port by default. Enable the Pipelock Ingress: ```yaml pipelock: enabled: true ingress: enabled: true className: nginx hosts: - host: pipelock.example.com paths: - path: / pathType: Prefix tls: - hosts: [pipelock.example.com] secretName: pipelock-tls ``` Or port-forward for testing: ```bash kubectl port-forward svc/sure-pipelock 8889:8889 -n sure ``` ### Monitoring Enable the ServiceMonitor for Prometheus scraping: ```yaml pipelock: serviceMonitor: enabled: true interval: 30s additionalLabels: release: prometheus ``` Metrics are available at `/metrics` on the forward proxy port (8888). ### Eviction protection For production, enable the PodDisruptionBudget: ```yaml pipelock: pdb: enabled: true maxUnavailable: 1 ``` See the [Helm chart README](../../charts/sure/README.md#pipelock-ai-agent-security-proxy) for all configuration options. ## Pipelock configuration file The `pipelock.example.yaml` file (Docker Compose) or ConfigMap (Helm) controls scanning behavior. Key sections: | Section | What it controls | |---------|-----------------| | `mode` | `strict` (block threats), `balanced` (warn + block critical), `audit` (log only) | | `forward_proxy` | Outbound HTTPS scanning (tunnel timeouts, idle timeouts) | | `dlp` | Data loss prevention (scan env vars, built-in patterns) | | `response_scanning` | Scan LLM responses for prompt injection | | `mcp_input_scanning` | Scan inbound MCP requests | | `mcp_tool_scanning` | Validate tool calls, detect drift | | `mcp_tool_policy` | Pre-execution rules (shell obfuscation, etc.) | | `mcp_session_binding` | Pin tool inventory, detect manipulation | | `tool_chain_detection` | Multi-step attack patterns | | `websocket_proxy` | WebSocket frame scanning (disabled by default) | | `logging` | Output format (json/text), verbosity | For the Helm chart, most sections are configurable via `values.yaml`. For additional sections not covered by structured values (session profiling, data budgets, kill switch), use the `extraConfig` escape hatch: ```yaml pipelock: extraConfig: session_profiling: enabled: true max_sessions: 1000 ``` ## Modes | Mode | Behavior | Use case | |------|----------|----------| | `strict` | Block all detected threats | Production with sensitive data | | `balanced` | Warn on low-severity, block on high-severity | Default; good for most deployments | | `audit` | Log everything, block nothing | Initial rollout, testing | Start with `audit` mode to see what Pipelock detects without blocking anything. Review the logs, then switch to `balanced` or `strict`. ## Limitations - Forward proxy only covers Faraday-based HTTP clients. Net::HTTP, HTTParty, and other libraries ignore `HTTPS_PROXY`. - Docker Compose has no egress network policies. The `/mcp` endpoint on port 3000 is still reachable directly (auth token required). For enforcement, use Kubernetes NetworkPolicies. - Pipelock scans text content. Binary payloads (images, file uploads) are passed through by default. ## Troubleshooting ### Pipelock container not starting Check the config file is mounted correctly: ```bash docker compose -f compose.ai.yml logs pipelock ``` Common issues: - Missing `pipelock.example.yaml` file - YAML syntax errors in config - Port conflicts (8888 or 8889 already in use) ### LLM calls failing with proxy errors If AI chat stops working after enabling Pipelock: ```bash # Check Pipelock logs for blocked requests docker compose -f compose.ai.yml logs pipelock --tail=50 ``` If requests are being incorrectly blocked, switch to `audit` mode in the config file and restart: ```yaml mode: audit ``` ### MCP requests not reaching Sure Verify the MCP upstream is configured correctly: ```bash # Test from inside the Pipelock container docker compose -f compose.ai.yml exec pipelock /pipelock healthcheck --addr 127.0.0.1:8888 ``` Check that `MCP_API_TOKEN` and `MCP_USER_EMAIL` are set in your `.env` file and that the email matches an existing Sure user.