Review findings from @diegomarino, all verified against the code before changing anything. The reconciliation claim was the serious one. get_account_statement told agents the checks were "the trustworthy part" and returned "the balances read off it" — but nothing reads balances off a document. MetadataDetector never touches them and create_from_prepared_upload! never sets them; they are user-editable fields in the Statement Vault UI. So a statement archived over MCP always came back with an empty check list, which an agent could easily read as "the document agrees with the ledger" when it means "nobody has entered the figures". The description now says so, and the payload carries a reconciliation_note spelling it out for anything reading only the JSON. Also noted that these checks are ledger agreement, not parse integrity: nothing here verifies a document's parts sum to its printed total. Provenance::Citation had two patterns disagreeing about spacing. GRADE_SUFFIX allowed "(grade:A)" but FORMAT required exactly one space, so that citation passed the pre-check and then parsed as ungraded with the grade swallowed into the text — silently discarding the reliability the caller supplied, which is the one thing this parser exists to prevent. list_account_statements downcases content_sha256 before querying. The column is constrained to lowercase hex, so uppercase input could never match, and an agent would read the empty result as "not archived" and upload a duplicate. Its period filters are renamed overlapping_from / overlapping_until, since they match on overlap and the old names claimed otherwise to anyone reading the schema without the descriptions. has_more now explains that there is no cursor and the way forward is a bigger limit or narrower filters. record_valuation no longer overwrites the entry's notes. Re-recording a date would destroy a note a person had written there. Nothing is removed now: an identical citation is a no-op, a changed one is appended, and the trail of what was cited when survives. Detecting "did this tool write that line?" is not possible — almost any prose parses as a valid ungraded citation — so the code does not guess. Minor: accept urlsafe base64 on upload, and explain in the code why record_valuation checks the account ACL rather than the vault manager role, so nobody "tightens" it into the wrong permission later. Tests cover each: the grade-spacing cases both ways, uppercase SHA lookup, overlap window boundaries, note preservation and no-stacking, the unavailable reconciliation note appearing and disappearing, and — per the review — that the download URL's signed id actually expires, rather than trusting the description's claim. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JFDp9HhXDeswadu4cxFojn
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MCP Server for External AI Assistants
Sure includes a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server endpoint that allows external AI assistants like Claude Desktop, GPT agents, or custom AI clients to query your financial data.
What is MCP?
Model Context Protocol is a JSON-RPC 2.0 protocol that enables AI assistants to access structured data and tools from external applications. Instead of copying and pasting financial data into a chat window, your AI assistant can directly query Sure's data through a secure API.
This is useful when:
- You want to use an external AI assistant (Claude, GPT, custom agents) to analyze your Sure financial data
- You prefer to keep your LLM provider separate from Sure
- You're building custom AI agents that need access to financial tools
Prerequisites
To enable the MCP endpoint, you need to set two environment variables:
| Variable | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
MCP_API_TOKEN |
Bearer token for authentication | your-secret-token-here |
MCP_USER_EMAIL |
Email of the Sure user whose data the assistant can access | user@example.com |
Both variables are required. The endpoint will not activate if either is missing.
Generating a secure token
Generate a random token for MCP_API_TOKEN:
# macOS/Linux
openssl rand -base64 32
# Or use any secure password generator
Choosing the user
The MCP_USER_EMAIL must match an existing Sure user's email address. The AI assistant will have access to all financial data for that user's family.
Caution
The AI assistant will have read access to all financial data for the specified user. Only set this for users you trust with your AI provider.
Configuration
Docker Compose
Add the environment variables to your compose.yml:
x-rails-env: &rails_env
MCP_API_TOKEN: your-secret-token-here
MCP_USER_EMAIL: user@example.com
Both web and worker services inherit this configuration.
Kubernetes (Helm)
Add the variables to your values.yaml or set them via Secrets:
env:
MCP_API_TOKEN: your-secret-token-here
MCP_USER_EMAIL: user@example.com
Or create a Secret and reference it:
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: sure-mcp-credentials
Protocol Details
The MCP endpoint is available at:
POST /mcp
Authentication
All requests must include the MCP_API_TOKEN as a Bearer token:
Authorization: Bearer <MCP_API_TOKEN>
Supported Methods
Sure implements the following JSON-RPC 2.0 methods:
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
initialize |
Protocol handshake, returns server info and capabilities |
tools/list |
Lists available financial tools with schemas |
tools/call |
Executes a tool with provided arguments |
Available Tools
The MCP endpoint exposes these financial tools:
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_transactions |
Retrieve transaction history with filtering |
get_accounts |
Get account information and balances |
get_holdings |
Query investment holdings |
get_balance_sheet |
Current financial position (assets, liabilities, net worth) |
get_income_statement |
Income and expenses over a period |
import_bank_statement |
Import bank statement data |
search_family_files |
Search uploaded documents in the vault |
These are the same tools used by Sure's builtin AI assistant.
Preview Tools
These additional tools appear only when the MCP user has opted into preview
features (Settings → Preferences). Until then they are absent from tools/list,
and calling one by name returns an "Unknown tool" error. The Statement Vault
tools additionally require the user to be an admin or member, matching the
permissions enforced in the web UI.
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
upload_account_statement |
Store a statement document (PDF/CSV/XLSX) in the Statement Vault; deduplicates by SHA-256 |
list_account_statements |
List vault documents with their SHA-256, period, linked account and review status |
get_account_statement |
One statement's details, a short-lived download URL, and its reconciliation checks against the ledger — present only once someone has entered the statement's opening/closing balances in the web UI, since nothing extracts them from the document |
get_statement_coverage |
Month-by-month statement coverage for an account: covered, missing, mismatched, ambiguous |
record_valuation |
Record an account's value on a date, with a required source citation |
They exist for agents that maintain a document-backed record of a family's wealth over time. See Patrimonial history with an external agent harness.
Example Requests
Initialize
Handshake to verify protocol version and capabilities:
curl -X POST https://your-sure-instance/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer your-secret-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "initialize"
}'
Response:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"result": {
"protocolVersion": "2025-03-26",
"capabilities": {
"tools": {}
},
"serverInfo": {
"name": "sure",
"version": "1.0"
}
}
}
List Tools
Get available tools with their schemas:
curl -X POST https://your-sure-instance/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer your-secret-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "tools/list"
}'
Response includes tool names, descriptions, and JSON schemas for parameters.
Call a Tool
Execute a tool to get transactions:
curl -X POST https://your-sure-instance/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer your-secret-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 3,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "get_transactions",
"arguments": {
"start_date": "2024-01-01",
"end_date": "2024-01-31"
}
}
}'
Response:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 3,
"result": {
"content": [
{
"type": "text",
"text": "[{\"id\":\"...\",\"amount\":-45.99,\"date\":\"2024-01-15\",\"name\":\"Coffee Shop\"}]"
}
]
}
}
Security Considerations
Transient Session Isolation
The MCP controller creates a transient session for each request. This prevents session state leaks that could expose other users' data if the Sure instance is using impersonation features.
Each MCP request:
- Authenticates the token
- Loads the user specified in
MCP_USER_EMAIL - Creates a temporary session scoped to that user
- Executes the tool call
- Discards the session
This ensures the AI assistant can only access data for the intended user.
Pipelock Security Scanning
For production deployments, we recommend using Pipelock to scan MCP traffic for security threats.
Pipelock provides:
- DLP scanning: Detects secrets being exfiltrated through tool calls
- Prompt injection detection: Identifies attempts to manipulate the AI
- Tool poisoning detection: Prevents malicious tool call sequences
- Policy enforcement: Block or warn on suspicious patterns
- Signed receipts: Produces verifiable evidence for mediated MCP decisions when the flight recorder is configured with storage and a signing key
See the Pipelock documentation and the example configuration in compose.example.ai.yml for setup instructions.
Network Security
The /mcp endpoint is exposed on the same port as the web UI (default 3000). For hardened deployments:
Docker Compose:
- The MCP endpoint is protected by the
MCP_API_TOKENbut is reachable on port 3000 - For additional security, use Pipelock's MCP reverse proxy (port 8889) which adds scanning
- See
compose.example.ai.ymlfor a Pipelock configuration
Kubernetes:
- Use NetworkPolicies to restrict access to the MCP endpoint
- Route external agents through Pipelock's MCP reverse proxy
- See the Helm chart documentation for Pipelock ingress setup
Production Deployment
For a production-ready setup with security scanning:
-
Download the example configuration:
curl -o compose.ai.yml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/we-promise/sure/main/compose.example.ai.yml curl -o pipelock.example.yaml https://raw.githubusercontent.com/we-promise/sure/main/pipelock.example.yaml -
Set your MCP credentials in
.env:MCP_API_TOKEN=your-secret-token MCP_USER_EMAIL=user@example.com -
Start the stack:
docker compose -f compose.ai.yml up -d -
Connect your AI assistant to the Pipelock MCP proxy:
http://your-server:8889
The Pipelock proxy (port 8889) scans all MCP traffic before forwarding to Sure's /mcp endpoint.
Connecting AI Assistants
Claude Desktop
Configure Claude Desktop to use Sure's MCP server:
- Open Claude Desktop settings
- Add a new MCP server
- Set the endpoint to
http://your-server:8889(if using Pipelock) orhttp://your-server:3000/mcp - Add the authorization header:
Authorization: Bearer your-secret-token
Custom Agents
Any AI agent that supports JSON-RPC 2.0 can connect to the MCP endpoint. The agent should:
- Send a POST request to
/mcp - Include the
Authorization: Bearer <token>header - Use the JSON-RPC 2.0 format for requests
- Handle the protocol methods:
initialize,tools/list,tools/call
Troubleshooting
"MCP endpoint not configured" error
Symptom: Requests return HTTP 503 with "MCP endpoint not configured"
Fix: Ensure both MCP_API_TOKEN and MCP_USER_EMAIL are set as environment variables and restart Sure.
"unauthorized" error
Symptom: Requests return HTTP 401 with "unauthorized"
Fix: Verify the Authorization header contains the correct token: Bearer <MCP_API_TOKEN>
"MCP user not configured" error
Symptom: Requests return HTTP 503 with "MCP user not configured"
Fix: The MCP_USER_EMAIL does not match an existing user. Check that:
- The email is correct
- The user exists in the database
- There are no typos or extra spaces
Pipelock connection refused
Symptom: AI assistant cannot connect to Pipelock's MCP proxy (port 8889)
Fix:
- Verify Pipelock is running:
docker compose ps pipelock - Check Pipelock health:
docker compose exec pipelock /pipelock healthcheck --addr 127.0.0.1:8888 - Verify the port is exposed in your
compose.yml
See Also
- External AI Assistant Configuration - Configure Sure's chat to use an external agent
- Pipelock Security Proxy - Set up security scanning for MCP traffic
- Model Context Protocol Specification - Official MCP documentation