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* feat(desktop): scaffold Tauri 2 macOS shell with empty window * feat(desktop): server store, URL normalization, and health-check helpers * feat(desktop): IPC commands for server list/add/remove/health + active-server state Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * feat(desktop): native onboarding server picker with health check and remembered servers * feat(desktop): vibrancy background, overlay titlebar, and inset traffic lights * feat(desktop): native menu bar with standard shortcuts and menu events * feat(desktop): webview→Rust bridge with native notifications * fix(desktop): gate bridge injection on PageLoadEvent::Finished Prevents double-injecting the bridge IIFE (once on Started, once on Finished), which was duplicating every native notification. * feat(desktop): Dock badge driven by webview attention count * feat(desktop): launch-at-login autostart commands * feat(desktop): sure:// deep link scheme with parse tests and navigation * feat(desktop): preferences window with server switcher and launch-at-login * docs(desktop): README for dev, release, signing/notarization, and deferred widget * fix(desktop): remove dead New Window menu item * fix(desktop): correct login route to /sessions/new Rails uses `resources :sessions` (plural), so the login page is /sessions/new, not the /session/new the plan assumed. Fixes an immediate 404 when connecting to a server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * feat(desktop): Sure-styled onboarding, draggable titlebar, and app content offset - Restyle onboarding + prefs to match Sure's auth page: solid surface background, centered logomark, .form-field-style inputs, inverse primary button; theme-aware via prefers-color-scheme (design-system tokens). - Add a draggable titlebar strip on bundled pages and inject one into the remote page so the window drags from the top everywhere. - Inject a top offset on the logged-in app-layout root so the sidebar logo clears the macOS traffic lights. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): de-dupe login navigation to prevent CSRF token/session race connect() navigated to /sessions/new directly AND via the active-server-changed event, which is also handled by a second listener injected into the page by bridge.js. One connect fired multiple concurrent GET /sessions/new requests, each minting a fresh session + CSRF token; the form shown and the _sure_session finally stored could come from different GETs, so the login POST failed 'Can't verify CSRF token authenticity' intermittently. Route all navigation through a single window-level guard so only the first request per server wins. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): enable window drag permission; offset only the icon rail - Add core:window:allow-start-dragging (+ show/set-focus, event emit/listen) to capabilities so data-tauri-drag-region actually drags the window on macOS. - Offset only the 84px left icon rail (logomark) to clear the traffic lights instead of pushing the entire app-layout down; keep main content full-height. - Drag strip z-index lowered below Sure's sticky headers so its controls stay clickable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * feat(desktop): persist active server and resume session on launch - Persist the active server to the Keychain in set_active_server; active_server falls back to it so a relaunch knows where to go. - On launch, auto-resume straight to the last server instead of showing the picker every time. - Navigate to the server root (not /sessions/new): Rails serves the dashboard when the session cookie is still valid, or redirects to login when not — so a persisted session no longer forces a re-login. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * feat: desktop SSO via system browser with PKCE code exchange Passkeys/WebAuthn don't work in an embedded WKWebView, so SSO now runs in the system browser and hands a session back to the app securely. Server (Rails): - GET /auth/desktop/:provider — stashes a PKCE S256 challenge, hands off to OmniAuth (reusing the mobile auto-submit form). Passkeys work (real browser). - openid_connect — for a linked identity in a desktop flow, mints a single-use, 2-min, PKCE-bound one-time code and redirects to sure://sso/callback?code=... (unlinked identities are sent back with an error). - GET /sessions/desktop_exchange — verifies the code + PKCE verifier (secure_compare), single-use (cache delete), then create_session_for; MFA is enforced at exchange time. Sets the normal web session cookie in the webview. - Tests: happy path + single-use, wrong-verifier rejection, missing challenge. Desktop (Tauri): - start_sso command: generates PKCE, opens the browser, stores the verifier. - sure://sso/callback deep link -> webview navigates to desktop_exchange with the verifier (never sent through the deep link, so an intercepted code is useless). - bridge.ts intercepts SSO provider form submits and routes them to start_sso; password login stays in the webview. - remote.json capability: minimal IPC (drag, event bridge, prefs window, start_sso) for the remote Sure origin — no fs/shell/http. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): correct remote IPC capability + handle menu in Rust + drag fallback Root cause of prefs/switch-server/SSO/drag doing nothing on the logged-in page: the remote-bridge capability's remote.urls ('https://*') did not match the server origin, so all IPC (event listen, invoke, drag command) was denied. Per Tauri v2, window.__TAURI__ is injected on remote pages only with withGlobalTauri (set) AND a matching remote.urls; patterns need a path wildcard. - remote.json: urls -> https://*/**, http://*/** (+ bare host) so any server origin matches. - menu.rs: Preferences and Switch Server now show the prefs window directly in Rust (no dependency on remote-page IPC); Switch Server moved from Window to the App menu. - bridge.ts: drops the menu-event listeners (Rust owns them), adds a startDragging mousedown fallback for the drag strip, logs diagnostics, and reports start_sso success/failure to the console. - main.ts: drops the now-unused menu listeners. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): SSO via event (remote can't invoke commands), disk-backed server store Diagnostics confirmed window.__TAURI__ + IPC work on the remote page, but a remote origin cannot invoke custom commands ('start_sso not allowed. Plugin not found'). Events are permitted, so SSO now goes through an event. - SSO: bridge emits 'sure://start-sso'; Rust listens and runs begin_sso (opens the system browser). start_sso command kept for local use. - servers: mirror the server list + active server to a JSON file in Application Support as a fallback — Keychain items don't persist for unsigned builds, which was wiping the saved server on relaunch. - remote.json: add notification:default (Sure's PWA was requesting it and erroring). - menu: log whether the prefs window is present when Preferences/Switch Server fire, to diagnose the no-op. - main: log the persisted active server on boot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): drag the top band on every page via mousedown, not a z-indexed strip The fixed drag strip sat below Sure's sticky headers (z-10) so it worked only on pages without a top header. Replace it with a document-level mousedown in the top ~34px that starts a window drag unless the target is an interactive element — so dragging works on all pages, Sure's titlebar controls stay clickable, and main content isn't pushed down. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * ci(desktop): tag-triggered GitHub Actions release for universal unsigned .dmg - .github/workflows/desktop-release.yml: on a 'desktop-v*' tag, build the universal (Apple Silicon + Intel) .dmg on a macOS runner via tauri-action and publish it to a GitHub Release with unsigned-install instructions. - README: universal build command, the tag-based release process, and the Gatekeeper 'Open Anyway' / xattr steps for end users. - Drop the unused iOS/Android icon sets (macOS build only needs icon.icns). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * ci(desktop): rolling desktop-latest build on desktop/ changes, not manual tags Replaces the manual desktop-v* tag release with a path-filtered workflow that builds only when desktop/ changes on main and publishes to a single rolling 'desktop-latest' prerelease with a stable Sure.dmg filename — one permanent download URL, and the file changes only when the desktop code does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * ci(desktop): tag-driven versioned releases; tag is the single source of version Revert to manual version tags (desktop-v*) for explicit version control, but derive the app/.dmg version from the tag so package.json + tauri.conf.json are synced automatically in CI — no manual version-file edits. Each tag produces its own versioned GitHub Release with the universal unsigned .dmg. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * ci(desktop): release entirely from GitHub via workflow_dispatch version input Make the GitHub Action the single tool to version + deploy the desktop app: Run workflow -> enter a version -> it syncs the version, builds the universal unsigned .dmg, and creates the desktop-v<version> tag + Release. Refuses to re-release an existing version; marks pre-release versions accordingly. Tag push (desktop-v*) still works as a secondary trigger. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * ci(desktop): publish releases with make_latest:false so they don't hijack the repo's Latest badge Desktop is a secondary artifact, not the main product. Build with tauri-action, then publish via action-gh-release with make_latest:false so the repo's 'Latest release' badge stays on the main app's v* release. Separate desktop-v* tag namespace already keeps it out of the v* publish workflow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): address PR review feedback (security + correctness) Security: - workflow: pass workflow_dispatch version via env (no shell injection); pin all third-party actions to commit SHAs. - SSO: gate deep-link navigation and begin_sso to servers the user has saved (is_known_server), so a rogue page/deep link can't drive them. - desktop_exchange is now POST (verifier in body, not URL/logs); CSRF skipped since the single-use PKCE code is the protection. - desktop_sso_start validates the code_challenge is a 43-char base64url digest. - desktop_exchange claims the one-time code atomically (delete-and-check) to close the read/delete TOCTOU. - failure: return desktop SSO errors to the app via sure://sso/callback?error. Correctness / stability: - prefs window hides on close instead of being destroyed, so the menu can reopen it. - servers.rs: on-disk store is authoritative (file-first read), atomic writes (temp + rename). - main.ts/prefs.ts: try/catch around add/set/remove/active_server and boot; add a shared serverErrorMessage helper (no duplicated substring checks). - vite.config.ts: derive dir from import.meta.url (ESM has no __dirname). - bridge.ts: coalesce MutationObserver scans to one per frame. - README: notarization example uses the universal .dmg name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): scope remote IPC to server origins at runtime, drop wildcard capability Resolves the remaining security finding: the static remote.json granted Tauri IPC to any http(s) origin (https://*). Remove it and instead add a capability scoped to each server's exact origin at runtime (CapabilityBuilder + add_capability), granting only the minimal permissions the bridge needs, for saved/active servers on startup and for the target in set_active_server. No origin outside the user's configured servers can access IPC. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): add runtime per-origin IPC capability (grant_server_capability) Implements the runtime-scoped capability that replaces the removed wildcard remote.json: CapabilityBuilder scoped to each server's exact origin, added via add_capability for saved/active servers at startup and in set_active_server. (Split from the previous commit, which only recorded the remote.json removal.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * ci(desktop): harden release workflow (no shared caches, environment gate) Address two release-workflow security findings: - Remove cache: npm and the swatinem/rust-cache step so a poisoned Actions cache written by another workflow can't flow into a published .dmg (P0). - Add 'environment: release' to the build job so publishing can require manual approval and scope secrets to release runs (P1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nno38ujctqiqSoY8eFRhaf * fix(desktop): remove transparency code and fix relaunch behavior * fix(desktop): fix PR review findings; adjust app notarization path, use Sure theme tokens instead of hardcoding values * ci(desktop): switch release from independant versioning to using Sure's publishing workflow, releasing and versioning with every main app release * fix(desktop): restrict CSP as much as possible while maintaining functionality; allow bundled scripts, Tauri IPC, inline styles; deny wildcards --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
504 lines
18 KiB
Ruby
504 lines
18 KiB
Ruby
class SessionsController < ApplicationController
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extend SslConfigurable
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before_action :set_session, only: :destroy
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skip_authentication only: %i[index new create openid_connect failure post_logout mobile_sso_start desktop_sso_start desktop_exchange]
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# The desktop exchange is a cross-context POST from the app's webview that
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# can't carry a CSRF token; the single-use, PKCE-bound one-time code is the
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# protection instead (same model as the OAuth callback).
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skip_forgery_protection only: :desktop_exchange
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layout "auth"
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# Handle GET /sessions (usually from browser back button)
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def index
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redirect_to new_session_path
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end
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def new
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store_pending_invitation_if_valid
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# Clear any stale mobile/desktop SSO session flag from an abandoned flow
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session.delete(:mobile_sso)
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session.delete(:desktop_sso)
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begin
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demo = Rails.application.config_for(:demo)
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@prefill_demo_credentials = demo_host_match?(demo)
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if @prefill_demo_credentials
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@email = params[:email].presence || demo["email"]
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@password = params[:password].presence || demo["password"]
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else
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@email = params[:email]
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@password = params[:password]
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end
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rescue RuntimeError, Errno::ENOENT, Psych::SyntaxError
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# Demo config file missing or malformed - disable demo credential prefilling
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@prefill_demo_credentials = false
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@email = params[:email]
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@password = params[:password]
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end
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end
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def create
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# Clear any stale mobile SSO session flag from an abandoned mobile flow
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session.delete(:mobile_sso)
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user = nil
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if AuthConfig.local_login_enabled?
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user = User.authenticate_by(email: params[:email], password: params[:password])
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else
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# Local login is disabled. Only allow attempts when an emergency super-admin
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# override is enabled and the email belongs to a super-admin.
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if AuthConfig.local_admin_override_enabled?
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candidate = User.find_by(email: params[:email])
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unless candidate&.super_admin?
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.create.local_login_disabled")
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return
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end
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user = User.authenticate_by(email: params[:email], password: params[:password])
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else
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.create.local_login_disabled")
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return
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end
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end
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if user
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if user.otp_required?
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log_super_admin_override_login(user)
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session[:mfa_user_id] = user.id
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redirect_to verify_mfa_path
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else
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log_super_admin_override_login(user)
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@session = create_session_for(user)
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flash[:notice] = t("invitations.accept_choice.joined_household") if accept_pending_invitation_for(user)
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redirect_to root_path
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end
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else
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flash.now[:alert] = t(".invalid_credentials")
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render :new, status: :unprocessable_entity
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end
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end
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def destroy
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user = Current.user
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id_token = session[:id_token_hint]
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login_provider = session[:sso_login_provider]
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# Find the identity for the provider used during login, with fallback to first if session data lost
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oidc_identity = if login_provider.present?
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user.oidc_identities.find_by(provider: login_provider)
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else
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user.oidc_identities.first
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end
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# Destroy local session
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@session.destroy
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session.delete(:id_token_hint)
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session.delete(:sso_login_provider)
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# Check if we should redirect to IdP for federated logout
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if oidc_identity && id_token.present?
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idp_logout_url = build_idp_logout_url(oidc_identity, id_token)
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if idp_logout_url
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SsoAuditLog.log_logout_idp!(user: user, provider: oidc_identity.provider, request: request)
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redirect_to idp_logout_url, allow_other_host: true
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return
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end
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end
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# Standard local logout
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SsoAuditLog.log_logout!(user: user, request: request)
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redirect_to new_session_path, notice: t(".logout_successful")
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end
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# Handle redirect back from IdP after federated logout
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def post_logout
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redirect_to new_session_path, notice: t(".logout_successful")
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end
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def mobile_sso_start
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provider = params[:provider].to_s
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configured_providers = Rails.configuration.x.auth.sso_providers.map { |p| p[:name].to_s }
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unless configured_providers.include?(provider)
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mobile_sso_redirect(error: "invalid_provider", message: "SSO provider not configured")
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return
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end
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device_params = params.permit(:device_id, :device_name, :device_type, :os_version, :app_version)
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unless device_params[:device_id].present? && device_params[:device_name].present? && device_params[:device_type].present?
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mobile_sso_redirect(error: "missing_device_info", message: "Device information is required")
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return
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end
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session[:mobile_sso] = {
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device_id: device_params[:device_id],
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device_name: device_params[:device_name],
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device_type: device_params[:device_type],
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os_version: device_params[:os_version],
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app_version: device_params[:app_version]
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}
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# Render auto-submitting form to POST to OmniAuth (required by omniauth-rails_csrf_protection)
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@provider = provider
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render layout: false
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end
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# Entry point for desktop-app SSO, opened in the system browser so passkeys
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# work. Stashes the desktop PKCE challenge, then hands off to OmniAuth exactly
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# like the mobile flow (reusing its auto-submitting form).
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def desktop_sso_start
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provider = params[:provider].to_s
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configured_providers = Rails.configuration.x.auth.sso_providers.map { |p| p[:name].to_s }
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unless configured_providers.include?(provider)
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.openid_connect.failed")
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return
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end
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code_challenge = params[:code_challenge].to_s
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# Require a well-formed PKCE (S256) challenge — a 43-char base64url SHA-256
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# digest — so the one-time code returned via the custom URL scheme can only
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# be redeemed by the app instance that started the flow (it alone holds the
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# verifier). Validate the format before copying it into session state.
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unless code_challenge.match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}\z/)
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.openid_connect.failed")
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return
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end
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session[:desktop_sso] = { code_challenge: code_challenge }
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@provider = provider
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render :mobile_sso_start, layout: false
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end
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# Exchanges the single-use, PKCE-bound code (delivered to the desktop app via
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# sure://sso/callback) for a real web session in the app's own webview.
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def desktop_exchange
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code = params[:code].to_s
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code_verifier = params[:code_verifier].to_s
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cache_key = "desktop_sso:#{code}"
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data = Rails.cache.read(cache_key)
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# Atomically claim the code: only the request whose delete actually removes
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# the entry may proceed, so two concurrent exchanges can't both succeed
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# (delete returns false for the loser). Redis/MemoryStore both report this.
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claimed = Rails.cache.delete(cache_key)
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if code.blank? || code_verifier.blank? || data.blank? || !claimed
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.openid_connect.failed")
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return
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end
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data = data.with_indifferent_access
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expected_challenge = Base64.urlsafe_encode64(Digest::SHA256.digest(code_verifier), padding: false)
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unless ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare(expected_challenge, data[:code_challenge].to_s)
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.openid_connect.failed")
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return
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end
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user = User.find_by(id: data[:user_id])
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unless user
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.openid_connect.failed")
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return
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end
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if user.otp_required?
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session[:mfa_user_id] = user.id
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redirect_to verify_mfa_path
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else
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@session = create_session_for(user)
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flash[:notice] = t("invitations.accept_choice.joined_household") if accept_pending_invitation_for(user)
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redirect_to root_path
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end
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end
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def openid_connect
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auth = request.env["omniauth.auth"]
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# Nil safety: ensure auth and required fields are present
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unless auth&.provider && auth&.uid
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redirect_to new_session_path, alert: t("sessions.openid_connect.failed")
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return
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end
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# Security fix: Look up by provider + uid, not just email
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oidc_identity = OidcIdentity.find_by(provider: auth.provider, uid: auth.uid)
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if oidc_identity
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# Existing OIDC identity found - authenticate the user
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user = oidc_identity.user
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oidc_identity.record_authentication!
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oidc_identity.sync_user_attributes!(auth)
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# Log successful SSO login
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SsoAuditLog.log_login!(user: user, provider: auth.provider, request: request)
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# Mobile SSO: issue Doorkeeper tokens and redirect to app
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if session[:mobile_sso].present?
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if user.otp_required?
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session.delete(:mobile_sso)
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mobile_sso_redirect(error: "mfa_not_supported", message: "MFA users should sign in with email and password")
|
|
else
|
|
handle_mobile_sso_callback(user)
|
|
end
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
# Desktop SSO: hand a single-use, PKCE-bound code back to the desktop app,
|
|
# which exchanges it for a normal web session. MFA is enforced later, at
|
|
# exchange time (the desktop webview can complete MFA), so it is supported.
|
|
if session[:desktop_sso].present?
|
|
handle_desktop_sso_callback(user)
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
# Store id_token and provider for RP-initiated logout
|
|
session[:id_token_hint] = auth.credentials&.id_token if auth.credentials&.id_token
|
|
session[:sso_login_provider] = auth.provider
|
|
|
|
# MFA check: If user has MFA enabled, require verification
|
|
if user.otp_required?
|
|
session[:mfa_user_id] = user.id
|
|
redirect_to verify_mfa_path
|
|
else
|
|
@session = create_session_for(user)
|
|
flash[:notice] = t("invitations.accept_choice.joined_household") if accept_pending_invitation_for(user)
|
|
redirect_to root_path
|
|
end
|
|
else
|
|
# Mobile SSO with no linked identity - cache pending auth and redirect
|
|
# back to the app with a linking code so the user can link or create an account
|
|
if session[:mobile_sso].present?
|
|
handle_mobile_sso_onboarding(auth)
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
# Desktop SSO with no linked identity: send the app back to the login
|
|
# screen with an error. Linking/JIT creation still happens through the
|
|
# normal web flow; the desktop handoff only resumes already-linked users.
|
|
if session[:desktop_sso].present?
|
|
session.delete(:desktop_sso)
|
|
redirect_to "sure://sso/callback?error=account_not_linked", allow_other_host: true
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
# No existing OIDC identity - need to link to account
|
|
# Store auth data in session and redirect to linking page
|
|
session[:pending_oidc_auth] = {
|
|
provider: auth.provider,
|
|
uid: auth.uid,
|
|
email: auth.info&.email,
|
|
name: auth.info&.name,
|
|
first_name: auth.info&.first_name,
|
|
last_name: auth.info&.last_name
|
|
}
|
|
redirect_to link_oidc_account_path
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def failure
|
|
# Sanitize reason to known values only
|
|
known_reasons = %w[sso_provider_unavailable sso_invalid_response sso_failed]
|
|
sanitized_reason = known_reasons.include?(params[:message]) ? params[:message] : "sso_failed"
|
|
|
|
# Log failed SSO attempt
|
|
SsoAuditLog.log_login_failed!(
|
|
provider: params[:strategy],
|
|
request: request,
|
|
reason: sanitized_reason
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Mobile SSO: redirect back to the app with error instead of web login page
|
|
if session[:mobile_sso].present?
|
|
session.delete(:mobile_sso)
|
|
mobile_sso_redirect(error: sanitized_reason, message: "SSO authentication failed")
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
# Desktop SSO: send the error back to the app via the custom scheme so it
|
|
# stops waiting, instead of stranding the flow on the web login page.
|
|
if session[:desktop_sso].present?
|
|
session.delete(:desktop_sso)
|
|
redirect_to "sure://sso/callback?error=#{sanitized_reason}", allow_other_host: true
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
message = case sanitized_reason
|
|
when "sso_provider_unavailable"
|
|
t("sessions.failure.sso_provider_unavailable")
|
|
when "sso_invalid_response"
|
|
t("sessions.failure.sso_invalid_response")
|
|
else
|
|
t("sessions.failure.sso_failed")
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
redirect_to new_session_path, alert: message
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
private
|
|
def handle_mobile_sso_callback(user)
|
|
device_info = session.delete(:mobile_sso)
|
|
|
|
unless device_info.present?
|
|
mobile_sso_redirect(error: "missing_session", message: "Mobile SSO session expired")
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
device = MobileDevice.upsert_device!(user, device_info.symbolize_keys)
|
|
token_response = device.issue_token!
|
|
|
|
# Store tokens behind a one-time authorization code instead of passing in URL
|
|
authorization_code = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)
|
|
Rails.cache.write(
|
|
"mobile_sso:#{authorization_code}",
|
|
token_response.merge(
|
|
user_id: user.id,
|
|
user_email: user.email,
|
|
user_first_name: user.first_name,
|
|
user_last_name: user.last_name,
|
|
user_ui_layout: user.ui_layout,
|
|
user_ai_enabled: user.ai_enabled?
|
|
),
|
|
expires_in: 5.minutes
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
mobile_sso_redirect(code: authorization_code)
|
|
rescue ActiveRecord::RecordInvalid => e
|
|
Rails.logger.warn("[Mobile SSO] Device save failed: #{e.record.errors.full_messages.join(', ')}")
|
|
mobile_sso_redirect(error: "device_error", message: "Unable to register device")
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def handle_desktop_sso_callback(user)
|
|
context = (session.delete(:desktop_sso) || {}).with_indifferent_access
|
|
code_challenge = context[:code_challenge]
|
|
|
|
if code_challenge.blank?
|
|
redirect_to "sure://sso/callback?error=missing_session", allow_other_host: true
|
|
return
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
# One-time authorization code, bound to the PKCE challenge, exchanged by
|
|
# the desktop webview for a session. Short TTL + single-use + PKCE.
|
|
code = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)
|
|
Rails.cache.write(
|
|
"desktop_sso:#{code}",
|
|
{ "user_id" => user.id, "code_challenge" => code_challenge },
|
|
expires_in: 2.minutes
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
redirect_to "sure://sso/callback?code=#{code}", allow_other_host: true
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def handle_mobile_sso_onboarding(auth)
|
|
device_info = session.delete(:mobile_sso)
|
|
email = auth.info&.email
|
|
|
|
has_pending_invitation = email.present? && Invitation.pending.exists?(email: email)
|
|
allow_creation = has_pending_invitation || (!AuthConfig.jit_link_only? && AuthConfig.allowed_oidc_domain?(email))
|
|
|
|
linking_code = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)
|
|
Rails.cache.write(
|
|
"mobile_sso_link:#{linking_code}",
|
|
{
|
|
provider: auth.provider,
|
|
uid: auth.uid,
|
|
email: email,
|
|
first_name: auth.info&.first_name,
|
|
last_name: auth.info&.last_name,
|
|
name: auth.info&.name,
|
|
issuer: auth.extra&.raw_info&.iss || auth.extra&.raw_info&.[]("iss"),
|
|
device_info: device_info,
|
|
allow_account_creation: allow_creation
|
|
},
|
|
expires_in: 10.minutes
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
mobile_sso_redirect(
|
|
status: "account_not_linked",
|
|
linking_code: linking_code,
|
|
email: email,
|
|
first_name: auth.info&.first_name,
|
|
last_name: auth.info&.last_name,
|
|
allow_account_creation: allow_creation,
|
|
has_pending_invitation: has_pending_invitation
|
|
)
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def mobile_sso_redirect(params = {})
|
|
redirect_to "sureapp://oauth/callback?#{params.to_query}", allow_other_host: true
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def set_session
|
|
@session = Current.user.sessions.find(params[:id])
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def log_super_admin_override_login(user)
|
|
# Only log when local login is globally disabled but an emergency
|
|
# super-admin override is enabled.
|
|
return if AuthConfig.local_login_enabled?
|
|
return unless AuthConfig.local_admin_override_enabled?
|
|
return unless user&.super_admin?
|
|
|
|
Rails.logger.info("[AUTH] Super admin override login: user_id=#{user.id} email=#{user.email}")
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def demo_host_match?(demo)
|
|
return false unless demo.present? && demo["hosts"].present?
|
|
|
|
demo["hosts"].include?(request.host)
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def build_idp_logout_url(oidc_identity, id_token)
|
|
# Find the provider configuration using unified loader (supports both YAML and DB providers)
|
|
provider_config = ProviderLoader.load_providers.find do |p|
|
|
p[:name] == oidc_identity.provider
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
return nil unless provider_config
|
|
|
|
# For OIDC providers, fetch end_session_endpoint from discovery
|
|
if provider_config[:strategy] == "openid_connect" && provider_config[:issuer].present?
|
|
begin
|
|
discovery_url = discovery_url_for(provider_config[:issuer])
|
|
response = Faraday.new(ssl: self.class.faraday_ssl_options).get(discovery_url) do |req|
|
|
req.options.timeout = 5
|
|
req.options.open_timeout = 3
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
return nil unless response.success?
|
|
|
|
discovery = JSON.parse(response.body)
|
|
end_session_endpoint = discovery["end_session_endpoint"]
|
|
|
|
return nil unless end_session_endpoint.present?
|
|
|
|
# Build the logout URL with post_logout_redirect_uri
|
|
post_logout_redirect = "#{request.base_url}/auth/logout/callback"
|
|
params = {
|
|
id_token_hint: id_token,
|
|
post_logout_redirect_uri: post_logout_redirect
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
"#{end_session_endpoint}?#{params.to_query}"
|
|
rescue Faraday::Error, JSON::ParserError, StandardError => e
|
|
Rails.logger.warn("[SSO] Failed to fetch OIDC discovery for logout: #{e.message}")
|
|
nil
|
|
end
|
|
else
|
|
nil
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def discovery_url_for(issuer)
|
|
if issuer.end_with?("/")
|
|
"#{issuer}.well-known/openid-configuration"
|
|
else
|
|
"#{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration"
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|