Files
sure/desktop/src-tauri/tests/servers_test.rs
T
ServaTilis 77a55fff5b fix(desktop): support a server hosted under a sub-path (#3127)
* fix(desktop): support a server hosted under a sub-path

`normalize_server_url` rebuilt whatever you typed as `scheme://host[:port]`
and dropped the path, so a self-hosted Sure behind a reverse proxy that
mounts it under a prefix — `https://home.example.com/sure` — could never
be added: the health check hit `{origin}/up`, where something else (or
nothing) answers, and the app reported "Couldn't reach a Sure server at
that address." The same bare origin was then used for the navigation, the
SSO hand-off and the IPC capability grant, so even a passing check would
have loaded the wrong site.

The path was being dropped for a reason — people paste the URL they have
in the clipboard, which is usually a deep link like `/sessions/new`. So
rather than guess, let the server say where it is: keep the path in the
canonical form, and have `check_server` probe `/up` from the address as
typed back up to the origin, returning the first base that answers 200.
A root-hosted server still resolves to its origin (one extra candidate,
tried only after the specific one 404s), and a transport-level failure
returns immediately instead of retrying a host that is not there.

`check_server` now answers with that resolved base instead of a bool, and
both callers save it rather than the raw input.

Tests: the sub-path base, trailing slash / query / fragment trimming, the
walk-up candidate list, ports preserved on every candidate, and the cap
that still keeps the origin.

* fix(desktop): carry the mounted base through SSO and deep links

Follow-up to the sub-path support in the previous commit: saving a base
with a path fixed adding and loading such a server, but left two flows
resolving against the bare origin.

The injected bridge only intercepted a form action shaped exactly
`/auth/{provider}`, so a mounted server's `/sure/auth/{provider}` was
never intercepted, and it emitted `location.origin`, which `begin_sso`
would then reject as an unknown server. Match the prefix that precedes
`/auth/` and emit the base it implies — empty at a domain root, so
root-hosted deployments are unaffected.

Deep links were gated on `target.server`, which `deep_link::parse` builds
from host and port alone. Gate on the destination instead, and let
`is_known_server` accept a URL that a saved base covers. `base_covers`
matches only at a path boundary, so a saved `https://sure.example.com`
does not cover `https://sure.example.com.evil.test`.

Reported by automated review on the PR.

* fix(desktop): cap candidates from the deep middle, not the shallow end

The cap kept the deepest MAX_BASE_CANDIDATES - 1 candidates plus the
origin, which discards the shallow ones in between — and a mount point is
shallow. A server mounted at /sure, reached by a link pasted three
segments into the app (`/sure/transactions/123/edit`), produced
`.../edit`, `.../123`, `/sure/transactions`, origin: `/sure`, the only
base that answers, was never probed, so the connection failed with
"Couldn't reach a Sure server at that address" against a live server.

Keep the address as typed plus the shallowest bases instead. Both
readings survive the cap: the base typed exactly, and the mount a deep
link sits under.

Reported by @jjmata in review.

* fix(desktop): bound discovery by mount depth, not candidate count

Capping the candidate list drops whole mount depths silently: with a
budget of four, `https://host/a/b/c/d/e` never probed `https://host/a/b/c`,
so a server mounted there was undiscoverable.

Bound the supported mount depth instead. The address as typed is always
probed first, so a base entered exactly still works at any depth; the
rest are every depth up to MAX_MOUNT_DEPTH, which keeps a pasted deep
link finite (typed + 4 probes) without skipping a depth in between.

Reported by coderabbitai in review.
2026-08-26 08:15:50 +02:00

125 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust

use sure_desktop_lib::servers::{
base_candidates, base_covers, health_check_url, is_healthy_status, normalize_server_url,
MAX_MOUNT_DEPTH,
};
#[test]
fn normalizes_bare_host_to_https_origin() {
assert_eq!(normalize_server_url("app.example.com").unwrap(), "https://app.example.com");
}
#[test]
fn preserves_explicit_http_scheme_and_port() {
assert_eq!(normalize_server_url("http://localhost:3000/").unwrap(), "http://localhost:3000");
}
#[test]
fn keeps_the_sub_path_a_server_is_mounted_under() {
assert_eq!(normalize_server_url("https://s.example.com/sure").unwrap(), "https://s.example.com/sure");
}
#[test]
fn strips_trailing_slash_query_and_fragment() {
assert_eq!(normalize_server_url("https://s.example.com/sure/").unwrap(), "https://s.example.com/sure");
assert_eq!(normalize_server_url("https://s.example.com/?a=1#x").unwrap(), "https://s.example.com");
}
#[test]
fn rejects_empty_input() {
assert!(normalize_server_url(" ").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn builds_health_url() {
assert_eq!(health_check_url("https://s.example.com"), "https://s.example.com/up");
assert_eq!(health_check_url("https://s.example.com/sure"), "https://s.example.com/sure/up");
}
#[test]
fn origin_is_its_own_only_candidate() {
assert_eq!(base_candidates("https://s.example.com"), vec!["https://s.example.com"]);
}
#[test]
fn walks_a_pasted_deep_link_back_up_to_the_origin() {
assert_eq!(
base_candidates("https://s.example.com/sessions/new"),
vec![
"https://s.example.com/sessions/new",
"https://s.example.com/sessions",
"https://s.example.com",
]
);
}
#[test]
fn keeps_the_port_on_every_candidate() {
assert_eq!(
base_candidates("http://localhost:3000/sure"),
vec!["http://localhost:3000/sure", "http://localhost:3000"]
);
}
#[test]
fn a_base_covers_itself_and_what_sits_under_it() {
assert!(base_covers("https://s.example.com", "https://s.example.com"));
assert!(base_covers("https://s.example.com", "https://s.example.com/accounts"));
assert!(base_covers("https://s.example.com/sure", "https://s.example.com/sure/accounts"));
}
#[test]
fn a_base_does_not_cover_a_lookalike_host_or_a_sibling_path() {
assert!(!base_covers("https://s.example.com", "https://s.example.com.evil.test/accounts"));
assert!(!base_covers("https://s.example.com/sure", "https://s.example.com/surely"));
assert!(!base_covers("https://s.example.com/sure", "https://s.example.com"));
}
// A deep link is probed against the address as typed and against every mount
// depth up to MAX_MOUNT_DEPTH — no supported mount is skipped, at any depth.
#[test]
fn probes_the_typed_address_and_every_supported_mount_depth() {
assert_eq!(
base_candidates("https://s.example.com/a/b/c/d/e"),
vec![
"https://s.example.com/a/b/c/d/e",
"https://s.example.com/a/b/c",
"https://s.example.com/a/b",
"https://s.example.com/a",
"https://s.example.com",
]
);
}
#[test]
fn probes_the_shallow_mount_a_deep_link_sits_under() {
let candidates = base_candidates("https://s.example.com/sure/transactions/123/edit");
assert!(
candidates.contains(&"https://s.example.com/sure".to_string()),
"the mount base was dropped: {candidates:?}"
);
assert_eq!(candidates[0], "https://s.example.com/sure/transactions/123/edit");
assert_eq!(candidates.last().unwrap(), "https://s.example.com");
}
#[test]
fn a_multi_segment_mount_is_reached_through_a_deep_link() {
let candidates = base_candidates("https://s.example.com/apps/finance/sure/accounts/42");
assert!(
candidates.contains(&"https://s.example.com/apps/finance/sure".to_string()),
"a {MAX_MOUNT_DEPTH}-segment mount was dropped: {candidates:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn the_walk_stays_bounded() {
let deep = format!("https://s.example.com/{}", vec!["seg"; 40].join("/"));
assert_eq!(base_candidates(&deep).len(), MAX_MOUNT_DEPTH + 2); // typed + depths 3..0
}
#[test]
fn only_200_is_healthy() {
assert!(is_healthy_status(200));
assert!(!is_healthy_status(302));
assert!(!is_healthy_status(500));
}