Files
sure/app/models/user.rb
LPW 84bfe5b7ab Add external AI assistant with Pipelock security proxy (#1069)
* feat(helm): add Pipelock ConfigMap, scanning config, and consolidate compose

- Add ConfigMap template rendering DLP, response scanning, MCP input/tool
  scanning, and forward proxy settings from values
- Mount ConfigMap as /etc/pipelock/pipelock.yaml volume in deployment
- Add checksum/config annotation for automatic pod restart on config change
- Gate HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY env injection on forwardProxy.enabled (skip
  in MCP-only mode)
- Use hasKey for all boolean values to prevent Helm default swallowing false
- Single source of truth for ports (forwardProxy.port/mcpProxy.port)
- Pipelock-specific imagePullSecrets with fallback to app secrets
- Merge standalone compose.example.pipelock.yml into compose.example.ai.yml
- Add pipelock.example.yaml for Docker Compose users
- Add exclude-paths to CI workflow for locale file false positives

* Add external assistant support (OpenAI-compatible SSE proxy)

Allow self-hosted instances to delegate chat to an external AI agent
via an OpenAI-compatible streaming endpoint. Configurable per-family
through Settings UI or ASSISTANT_TYPE env override.

- Assistant::External::Client: SSE streaming HTTP client (no new gems)
- Settings UI with type selector, env lock indicator, config status
- Helm chart and Docker Compose env var support
- 45 tests covering client, config, routing, controller, integration

* Add session key routing, email allowlist, and config plumbing

Route to the actual OpenClaw session via x-openclaw-session-key header
instead of creating isolated sessions. Gate external assistant access
behind an email allowlist (EXTERNAL_ASSISTANT_ALLOWED_EMAILS env var).
Plumb session_key and allowedEmails through Helm chart, compose, and
env template.

* Add HTTPS_PROXY support to External::Client for Pipelock integration

Net::HTTP does not auto-read HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY env vars (unlike
Faraday). Explicitly resolve proxy from environment in build_http so
outbound traffic to the external assistant routes through Pipelock's
forward proxy when enabled. Respects NO_PROXY for internal hosts.

* Add UI fields for external assistant config (Setting-backed with env fallback)

Follow the same pattern as OpenAI settings: database-backed Setting
fields with env var defaults. Self-hosters can now configure the
external assistant URL, token, and agent ID from the browser
(Settings > Self-Hosting > AI Assistant) instead of requiring env vars.
Fields disable when the corresponding env var is set.

* Improve external assistant UI labels and add help text

Change placeholder to generic OpenAI-compatible URL pattern. Add help
text under each field explaining where the values come from: URL from
agent provider, token for authentication, agent ID for multi-agent
routing.

* Add external assistant docs and fix URL help text

Add External AI Assistant section to docs/hosting/ai.md covering setup
(UI and env vars), how it works, Pipelock security scanning, access
control, and Docker Compose example. Drop "chat completions" jargon
from URL help text.

* Harden external assistant: retry logic, disconnect UI, error handling, and test coverage

- Add retry with backoff for transient network errors (no retry after streaming starts)
- Add disconnect button with confirmation modal in self-hosting settings
- Narrow rescue scope with fallback logging for unexpected errors
- Safe cleanup of partial responses on stream interruption
- Gate ai_available? on family assistant_type instead of OR-ing all providers
- Truncate conversation history to last 20 messages
- Proxy-aware HTTP client with NO_PROXY support
- Sanitize protocol to use generic headers (X-Agent-Id, X-Session-Key)
- Full test coverage for streaming, retries, proxy routing, config, and disconnect

* Exclude external assistant client from Pipelock scan-diff

False positive: `@token` instance variable flagged as "Credential in URL".
Temporary workaround until Pipelock supports inline suppression.

* Address review feedback: NO_PROXY boundary fix, SSE done flag, design tokens

- Fix NO_PROXY matching to require domain boundary (exact match or .suffix),
  case-insensitive. Prevents badexample.com matching example.com.
- Add done flag to SSE streaming so read_body stops after [DONE]
- Move MAX_CONVERSATION_MESSAGES to class level
- Use bg-success/bg-destructive design tokens for status indicators
- Add rationale comment for pipelock scan exclusion
- Update docs last-updated date

* Address second round of review feedback

- Allowlist email comparison is now case-insensitive and nil-safe
- Cap SSE buffer at 1 MB to prevent memory blowup from malformed streams
- Don't expose upstream HTTP response body in user-facing errors (log it instead)
- Fix frozen string warning on buffer initialization
- Fix "builtin" typo in docs (should be "built-in")

* Protect completed responses from cleanup, sanitize error messages

- Don't destroy a fully streamed assistant message if post-stream
  metadata update fails (only cleanup partial responses)
- Log raw connection/HTTP errors internally, show generic messages
  to users to avoid leaking network/proxy details
- Update test assertions for new error message wording

* Fix SSE content guard and NO_PROXY test correctness

Use nil check instead of present? for SSE delta content to preserve
whitespace-only chunks (newlines, spaces) that can occur in code output.

Fix NO_PROXY test to use HTTP_PROXY matching the http:// client URL so
the proxy resolution and NO_PROXY bypass logic are actually exercised.

* Forward proxy credentials to Net::HTTP

Pass proxy_uri.user and proxy_uri.password to Net::HTTP.new so
authenticated proxies (http://user:pass@host:port) work correctly.
Without this, credentials parsed from the proxy URL were silently
dropped. Nil values are safe as positional args when no creds exist.

* Update pipelock integration to v0.3.1 with full scanning config

Bump Helm image tag from 0.2.7 to 0.3.1. Add missing security
sections to both the Helm ConfigMap and compose example config:
mcp_tool_policy, mcp_session_binding, and tool_chain_detection.
These protect the /mcp endpoint against tool injection, session
hijacking, and multi-step exfiltration chains.

Add version and mode fields to config files. Enable include_defaults
for DLP and response scanning to merge user patterns with the 35
built-in patterns. Remove redundant --mode CLI flag from the Helm
deployment template since mode is now in the config file.
2026-03-03 15:47:51 +01:00

417 lines
12 KiB
Ruby

class User < ApplicationRecord
include Encryptable
# Allow nil password for SSO-only users (JIT provisioning).
# Custom validation ensures password is present for non-SSO registration.
has_secure_password validations: false
# Encrypt sensitive fields if ActiveRecord encryption is configured
if encryption_ready?
# MFA secrets
encrypts :otp_secret, deterministic: true
# Note: otp_backup_codes is a PostgreSQL array column which doesn't support
# AR encryption. To encrypt it, a migration would be needed to change the
# column type from array to text/jsonb.
# PII - emails (deterministic for lookups, downcase for case-insensitive)
encrypts :email, deterministic: true, downcase: true
encrypts :unconfirmed_email, deterministic: true, downcase: true
# PII - names (non-deterministic for maximum security)
encrypts :first_name
encrypts :last_name
end
belongs_to :family
belongs_to :last_viewed_chat, class_name: "Chat", optional: true
has_many :sessions, dependent: :destroy
has_many :chats, dependent: :destroy
has_many :api_keys, dependent: :destroy
has_many :mobile_devices, dependent: :destroy
has_many :invitations, foreign_key: :inviter_id, dependent: :destroy
has_many :impersonator_support_sessions, class_name: "ImpersonationSession", foreign_key: :impersonator_id, dependent: :destroy
has_many :impersonated_support_sessions, class_name: "ImpersonationSession", foreign_key: :impersonated_id, dependent: :destroy
has_many :oidc_identities, dependent: :destroy
has_many :sso_audit_logs, dependent: :nullify
accepts_nested_attributes_for :family, update_only: true
validates :email, presence: true, uniqueness: true, format: { with: URI::MailTo::EMAIL_REGEXP }
validate :ensure_valid_profile_image
validates :default_period, inclusion: { in: Period::PERIODS.keys }
validates :default_account_order, inclusion: { in: AccountOrder::ORDERS.keys }
validates :locale, inclusion: { in: I18n.available_locales.map(&:to_s) }, allow_nil: true
# Password is required on create unless the user is being created via SSO JIT.
# SSO JIT users have password_digest = nil and authenticate via OIDC only.
validates :password, presence: true, on: :create, unless: :skip_password_validation?
validates :password, length: { minimum: 8 }, allow_nil: true
normalizes :email, with: ->(email) { email.strip.downcase }
normalizes :unconfirmed_email, with: ->(email) { email&.strip&.downcase }
normalizes :first_name, :last_name, with: ->(value) { value.strip.presence }
enum :role, { guest: "guest", member: "member", admin: "admin", super_admin: "super_admin" }, validate: true
enum :ui_layout, { dashboard: "dashboard", intro: "intro" }, validate: true, prefix: true
before_validation :apply_ui_layout_defaults
before_validation :apply_role_based_ui_defaults
# Returns the appropriate role for a new user creating a family.
# The very first user of an instance becomes super_admin; subsequent users
# get the specified fallback role (typically :admin for family creators).
def self.role_for_new_family_creator(fallback_role: :admin)
User.exists? ? fallback_role : :super_admin
end
has_one_attached :profile_image, dependent: :purge_later do |attachable|
attachable.variant :thumbnail, resize_to_fill: [ 300, 300 ], convert: :webp, saver: { quality: 80 }
attachable.variant :small, resize_to_fill: [ 72, 72 ], convert: :webp, saver: { quality: 80 }, preprocessed: true
end
validate :profile_image_size
generates_token_for :password_reset, expires_in: 15.minutes do
password_salt&.last(10)
end
generates_token_for :email_confirmation, expires_in: 1.day do
unconfirmed_email
end
def pending_email_change?
unconfirmed_email.present?
end
def initiate_email_change(new_email)
return false if new_email == email
if Rails.application.config.app_mode.self_hosted? && !Setting.require_email_confirmation
update(email: new_email)
else
if update(unconfirmed_email: new_email)
EmailConfirmationMailer.with(user: self).confirmation_email.deliver_later
true
else
false
end
end
end
def resend_confirmation_email
if pending_email_change?
EmailConfirmationMailer.with(user: self).confirmation_email.deliver_later
true
else
false
end
end
def request_impersonation_for(user_id)
impersonated = User.find(user_id)
impersonator_support_sessions.create!(impersonated: impersonated)
end
def admin?
super_admin? || role == "admin"
end
def display_name
[ first_name, last_name ].compact.join(" ").presence || email
end
def initial
(display_name&.first || email.first).upcase
end
def initials
if first_name.present? && last_name.present?
"#{first_name.first}#{last_name.first}".upcase
else
initial
end
end
def show_ai_sidebar?
show_ai_sidebar
end
def ai_available?
return true unless Rails.application.config.app_mode.self_hosted?
effective_type = ENV["ASSISTANT_TYPE"].presence || family&.assistant_type.presence || "builtin"
case effective_type
when "external"
Assistant::External.available_for?(self)
else
ENV["OPENAI_ACCESS_TOKEN"].present? || Setting.openai_access_token.present?
end
end
def ai_enabled?
ai_enabled && ai_available?
end
def self.default_ui_layout
layout = Rails.application.config.x.ui&.default_layout || "dashboard"
layout.in?(%w[intro dashboard]) ? layout : "dashboard"
end
# SSO-only users have OIDC identities but no local password.
# They cannot use password reset or local login.
def sso_only?
password_digest.nil? && oidc_identities.exists?
end
# Check if user has a local password set (can authenticate locally)
def has_local_password?
password_digest.present?
end
# Attribute to skip password validation during SSO JIT provisioning
attr_accessor :skip_password_validation
# Deactivation
validate :can_deactivate, if: -> { active_changed? && !active }
after_update_commit :purge_later, if: -> { saved_change_to_active?(from: true, to: false) }
def deactivate
update active: false, email: deactivated_email
end
def can_deactivate
if admin? && family.users.count > 1
errors.add(:base, :cannot_deactivate_admin_with_other_users)
end
end
def purge_later
UserPurgeJob.perform_later(self)
end
def purge
if last_user_in_family?
family.destroy
else
destroy
end
end
# MFA
def setup_mfa!
update!(
otp_secret: ROTP::Base32.random(32),
otp_required: false,
otp_backup_codes: []
)
end
def enable_mfa!
update!(
otp_required: true,
otp_backup_codes: generate_backup_codes
)
end
def disable_mfa!
update!(
otp_secret: nil,
otp_required: false,
otp_backup_codes: []
)
end
def verify_otp?(code)
return false if otp_secret.blank?
return true if verify_backup_code?(code)
totp.verify(code, drift_behind: 15)
end
def provisioning_uri
return nil unless otp_secret.present?
totp.provisioning_uri(email)
end
def onboarded?
onboarded_at.present?
end
def needs_onboarding?
!onboarded?
end
def account_order
AccountOrder.find(default_account_order) || AccountOrder.default
end
# Dashboard preferences management
def dashboard_section_collapsed?(section_key)
preferences&.dig("collapsed_sections", section_key) == true
end
def dashboard_section_order
preferences&.[]("section_order") || default_dashboard_section_order
end
def update_dashboard_preferences(prefs)
# Use pessimistic locking to ensure atomic read-modify-write
# This prevents race conditions when multiple sections are collapsed quickly
transaction do
lock! # Acquire row-level lock (SELECT FOR UPDATE)
updated_prefs = (preferences || {}).deep_dup
prefs.each do |key, value|
if value.is_a?(Hash)
updated_prefs[key] ||= {}
updated_prefs[key] = updated_prefs[key].merge(value)
else
updated_prefs[key] = value
end
end
update!(preferences: updated_prefs)
end
end
# Reports preferences management
def reports_section_collapsed?(section_key)
preferences&.dig("reports_collapsed_sections", section_key) == true
end
def reports_section_order
preferences&.[]("reports_section_order") || default_reports_section_order
end
def update_reports_preferences(prefs)
# Use pessimistic locking to ensure atomic read-modify-write
transaction do
lock!
updated_prefs = (preferences || {}).deep_dup
prefs.each do |key, value|
if value.is_a?(Hash)
updated_prefs[key] ||= {}
updated_prefs[key] = updated_prefs[key].merge(value)
else
updated_prefs[key] = value
end
end
update!(preferences: updated_prefs)
end
end
# Transactions preferences management
def transactions_section_collapsed?(section_key)
preferences&.dig("transactions_collapsed_sections", section_key) == true
end
def update_transactions_preferences(prefs)
transaction do
lock!
updated_prefs = (preferences || {}).deep_dup
prefs.each do |key, value|
if value.is_a?(Hash)
updated_prefs["transactions_#{key}"] ||= {}
updated_prefs["transactions_#{key}"] = updated_prefs["transactions_#{key}"].merge(value)
else
updated_prefs["transactions_#{key}"] = value
end
end
update!(preferences: updated_prefs)
end
end
private
def apply_ui_layout_defaults
self.ui_layout = (ui_layout.presence || self.class.default_ui_layout)
end
def apply_role_based_ui_defaults
if ui_layout_intro?
if guest?
self.show_sidebar = false
self.show_ai_sidebar = false
self.ai_enabled = true
else
self.ui_layout = "dashboard"
end
elsif guest?
self.ui_layout = "intro"
self.show_sidebar = false
self.show_ai_sidebar = false
self.ai_enabled = true
end
if leaving_guest_role?
self.show_sidebar = true unless show_sidebar
self.show_ai_sidebar = true unless show_ai_sidebar
end
end
def leaving_guest_role?
return false unless will_save_change_to_role?
previous_role, new_role = role_change_to_be_saved
previous_role == "guest" && new_role != "guest"
end
def skip_password_validation?
skip_password_validation == true
end
def default_dashboard_section_order
%w[cashflow_sankey outflows_donut net_worth_chart balance_sheet]
end
def default_reports_section_order
%w[trends_insights transactions_breakdown]
end
def ensure_valid_profile_image
return unless profile_image.attached?
unless profile_image.content_type.in?(%w[image/jpeg image/png])
errors.add(:profile_image, "must be a JPEG or PNG")
profile_image.purge
end
end
def last_user_in_family?
family.users.count == 1
end
def deactivated_email
email.gsub(/@/, "-deactivated-#{SecureRandom.uuid}@")
end
def profile_image_size
if profile_image.attached? && profile_image.byte_size > 10.megabytes
errors.add(:profile_image, :invalid_file_size, max_megabytes: 10)
end
end
def totp
ROTP::TOTP.new(otp_secret, issuer: "Sure Finances")
end
def verify_backup_code?(code)
return false if otp_backup_codes.blank?
# Find and remove the used backup code
if (index = otp_backup_codes.index(code))
remaining_codes = otp_backup_codes.dup
remaining_codes.delete_at(index)
update!(otp_backup_codes: remaining_codes)
true
else
false
end
end
def generate_backup_codes
8.times.map { SecureRandom.hex(4) }
end
end