mirror of
https://github.com/we-promise/sure.git
synced 2026-09-02 13:21:17 +00:00
Josh
2f821e2567
* chore(security): update Pipelock integration to 3.4.0 * fix(ci): validate shipped Pipelock configs * fix(security): isolate external assistant profile * fix(ci): build Helm dependencies before validation * fix(ci): strengthen Pipelock contract checks
106 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML
106 lines
3.1 KiB
YAML
# Pipelock configuration for Docker Compose
|
|
# See https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock for full options.
|
|
#
|
|
# This file is validated in CI with Pipelock 3.4.0. See the release changelog
|
|
# for the full control surface and upgrade notes.
|
|
# Run `pipelock assess init --config <file>` to create an assessment workspace.
|
|
# Run `pipelock audit score --config <file>` for a security posture score (0-100).
|
|
# Run `pipelock doctor` to verify configured protections are actually enforceable.
|
|
|
|
version: 1
|
|
mode: balanced
|
|
|
|
# Trusted domains: allow services whose public DNS resolves to private IPs.
|
|
# Prevents SSRF scanner from blocking legitimate internal traffic.
|
|
# trusted_domains:
|
|
# - "api.internal.example.com"
|
|
# - "*.corp.example.com"
|
|
|
|
forward_proxy:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
max_tunnel_seconds: 300
|
|
idle_timeout_seconds: 60
|
|
|
|
websocket_proxy:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
max_message_bytes: 1048576
|
|
max_concurrent_connections: 128
|
|
scan_text_frames: true
|
|
allow_binary_frames: false
|
|
forward_cookies: false
|
|
strip_compression: true
|
|
max_connection_seconds: 3600
|
|
idle_timeout_seconds: 300
|
|
origin_policy: rewrite
|
|
|
|
dlp:
|
|
scan_env: true
|
|
include_defaults: true
|
|
|
|
response_scanning:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
action: warn
|
|
include_defaults: true
|
|
|
|
mcp_input_scanning:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
action: block
|
|
on_parse_error: block
|
|
|
|
mcp_tool_scanning:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
action: warn
|
|
detect_drift: true
|
|
|
|
mcp_tool_policy:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
action: warn
|
|
# Redirect profiles: route matched tool calls to audited handler programs
|
|
# instead of blocking. The handler returns a synthetic MCP response.
|
|
# redirect_profiles:
|
|
# safe-fetch:
|
|
# exec: ["/pipelock", "internal-redirect", "fetch-proxy"]
|
|
# reason: "Route fetch calls through audited proxy"
|
|
|
|
mcp_session_binding:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
unknown_tool_action: warn
|
|
|
|
tool_chain_detection:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
action: warn
|
|
window_size: 20
|
|
max_gap: 3
|
|
|
|
# Request body scanning covers cleartext HTTP, reverse-proxy, and WebSocket
|
|
# bodies. It cannot inspect encrypted HTTPS tunnel bodies unless TLS
|
|
# interception is separately configured and its CA trusted by the client.
|
|
# In enforce mode, prompt-injection findings hard-block non-provider
|
|
# destinations even when action is "warn". Trusted provider hosts (OpenAI,
|
|
# Anthropic, etc.) remain exempt via the response_scanning exemption list.
|
|
request_body_scanning:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
action: warn
|
|
max_body_bytes: 5242880
|
|
scan_headers: true
|
|
header_mode: sensitive
|
|
|
|
# Health watchdog (pipelock 2.4+): /health returns 503 when any subsystem
|
|
# heartbeat goes stale. Enabled by default; set expose_subsystems true to
|
|
# include a per-subsystem boolean map in /health responses.
|
|
health_watchdog:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
interval_seconds: 2
|
|
expose_subsystems: false
|
|
|
|
# Flight recorder (pipelock 2.7+): signed, hash-chained action receipts.
|
|
# Enabled by default, but inert until both `dir` and `signing_key_path` are set.
|
|
# For Docker Compose, mount ./pipelock-evidence and ./pipelock-keys as shown in
|
|
# compose.example.ai.yml, then uncomment these paths.
|
|
flight_recorder:
|
|
enabled: true
|
|
require_receipts: false
|
|
redact: true
|
|
# dir: /var/lib/pipelock/evidence
|
|
# signing_key_path: /etc/pipelock/keys/flight-recorder-signing.key
|