Closes the residual surface from the three published SSRF advisories (GHSA-pc5v-8xwc-v9xq, GHSA-38hf-fq8x-q49r, GHSA-q9wx-ggwq-mcgh / CVE-2026-34365 to 34367). The original fix in 07757e74 only sanitized the Notes field via Invoice/Estimate/Payment::getNotes(), but the same blade templates also render company/billing/shipping address fields with {!! !!} (Blade unescaped output). Those address strings are produced by getCompanyAddress(), getCustomerBillingAddress(), getCustomerShippingAddress() which feed into GeneratesPdfTrait::getFormattedString() — and that method does not call PdfHtmlSanitizer.
Customer-controlled fields (name, street, phone, custom field values) are substituted into address templates via getFieldsArray() without HTML-escaping. A malicious customer name like "Acme <img src='http://attacker/probe'>" therefore reaches Dompdf as raw HTML through the address path, exactly the same CWE-918 SSRF pattern the advisories describe — only blocked today by the secondary defense of dompdf's enable_remote=false. If a self-hoster sets DOMPDF_ENABLE_REMOTE=true for legitimate remote logos, the address surface immediately re-opens.
Move the PdfHtmlSanitizer::sanitize() call into the chokepoint at GeneratesPdfTrait::getFormattedString(), so all four sinks — notes plus the three address fields, on all three models — get the same treatment via a single call site. The explicit wrapper in each model's getNotes() becomes redundant and is removed (along with the now-unused App\Support\PdfHtmlSanitizer imports). Verified getFormattedString() is only called from PDF code paths (no email body callers, which use strtr() directly) so there is no risk of stripping useful HTML from a non-PDF context.
Extends tests/Unit/PdfHtmlSanitizerTest.php with three new cases covering the address-template scenario, iframe/link tag stripping, and on* event handler removal. All 8 tests pass via vendor/bin/pest tests/Unit/PdfHtmlSanitizerTest.php.
Darko Gjorgjijoski