The orderByField/orderBy query params were passed straight into Eloquent's
orderBy() in every model's scopeWhereOrder (and Invoice::scopeApplyFilters),
allowing arbitrary SQL in the ORDER BY clause (boolean-based blind injection).
Adds App\Support\SafeOrderBy::apply() which only accepts a plain, optionally
table-qualified column identifier as the sort target (rejecting expressions,
sub-selects, etc.) and clamps the direction to asc/desc. Routed all 10 model
sort sinks through it. Table-qualified columns stay valid, so joined/aliased
sorts (e.g. estimates by customers.name) are unaffected.
Adds unit tests covering injection rejection, plain + aliased columns, and
direction clamping.
Customer PDF controllers resolved the target document by raw mailable_id,
ignoring mailable_type, and skipped the expiry check on the JSON endpoints.
- Resolve via the $emailLog->mailable morph relation and assert the expected
type (abort 404) so a token issued for one document type can't disclose
another whose numeric id collides.
- Enforce isExpired() (abort 403) on every public path, including the JSON
getInvoice/getEstimate/getPayment endpoints.
- Harden EmailLog::isExpired() to treat a null/unresolvable mailable as
expired instead of throwing.
Adds tests for cross-type 404, JSON-path expiry 403, and the valid path.
- Notes IDOR (GHSA-85wc): NotePolicy::viewNotes/manageNotes now receive the
Note and require hasCompany($note->company_id); NotesController passes the
bound model to authorize() on show/update/destroy.
- Estimate->Invoice IDOR (GHSA-j2vg): ConvertEstimateController authorizes
'view' on the source estimate before creating the invoice.
- User bulk-delete (GHSA-wxrv): UsersController scopes candidate ids via
User::whereCompany() before deletion so cross-company accounts are protected.
Adds feature tests for cross-company 403s plus same-company happy paths.
The v2 self-updater only overlays new files (copyFiles) and never removes
files a release deleted; the one removal path (deleted_files) is not even
sent by the web UI. A major upgrade (v2 → v3) removes thousands of files,
so overlay-only leaves a broken hybrid, and stale bootstrap/cache config +
package-discovery survive and break the new boot.
Backport v3's manifest allow-list approach into this final v2 release:
- Updater::cleanStaleFiles(?string $basePath): delete every file under the
install not listed in the release's manifest.json, except the configured
update_protected_paths. No manifest present → safe no-op (v2→v2 updates).
- Updater::clearCompiledCaches(): wipe bootstrap/cache/*.php and compiled
views so the freshly copied release re-reads config and re-runs package
discovery. Called at the end of copyFiles() — the last point that runs as
the currently-installed code before the new release boots, and necessary
because bootstrap/cache is itself a protected path.
- DeleteFilesController + UpdateCommand: when manifest.json is present, run
cleanStaleFiles(); otherwise fall back to the legacy deleted_files list.
No route or frontend change — both already call the delete step between
copy and migrate.
- config/invoiceshelf.php: add update_protected_paths (.env, storage,
vendor, node_modules, Modules, public/storage, .git, bootstrap/cache,
manifest.json).
The v3 release zip already ships manifest.json (built by its make dist), so
a v2 instance running this updater cleans itself up correctly on upgrade.
Tested: tests/Unit/UpdaterTest.php covers stale removal, protected-path and
manifest preservation, empty-dir pruning, no-manifest no-op, and invalid
manifest. Full suite green.
Closes the residual surface from the three published SSRF advisories (GHSA-pc5v-8xwc-v9xq, GHSA-38hf-fq8x-q49r, GHSA-q9wx-ggwq-mcgh / CVE-2026-34365 to 34367). The original fix in 07757e74 only sanitized the Notes field via Invoice/Estimate/Payment::getNotes(), but the same blade templates also render company/billing/shipping address fields with {!! !!} (Blade unescaped output). Those address strings are produced by getCompanyAddress(), getCustomerBillingAddress(), getCustomerShippingAddress() which feed into GeneratesPdfTrait::getFormattedString() — and that method does not call PdfHtmlSanitizer.
Customer-controlled fields (name, street, phone, custom field values) are substituted into address templates via getFieldsArray() without HTML-escaping. A malicious customer name like "Acme <img src='http://attacker/probe'>" therefore reaches Dompdf as raw HTML through the address path, exactly the same CWE-918 SSRF pattern the advisories describe — only blocked today by the secondary defense of dompdf's enable_remote=false. If a self-hoster sets DOMPDF_ENABLE_REMOTE=true for legitimate remote logos, the address surface immediately re-opens.
Move the PdfHtmlSanitizer::sanitize() call into the chokepoint at GeneratesPdfTrait::getFormattedString(), so all four sinks — notes plus the three address fields, on all three models — get the same treatment via a single call site. The explicit wrapper in each model's getNotes() becomes redundant and is removed (along with the now-unused App\Support\PdfHtmlSanitizer imports). Verified getFormattedString() is only called from PDF code paths (no email body callers, which use strtr() directly) so there is no risk of stripping useful HTML from a non-PDF context.
Extends tests/Unit/PdfHtmlSanitizerTest.php with three new cases covering the address-template scenario, iframe/link tag stripping, and on* event handler removal. All 8 tests pass via vendor/bin/pest tests/Unit/PdfHtmlSanitizerTest.php.
