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Author SHA1 Message Date
Amin Ghadersohi
a4a7f876a9 fix(mcp): address code review findings for RBAC tool visibility
- Fail closed (return only public tools) when credentials are invalid
  (PermissionError from bad API key, ValueError from unknown dev username);
  fail open only when no auth source is configured at all
- Extract _get_app_context_manager() to module level in auth.py so
  RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware reuses the same context-selection logic as
  mcp_auth_hook, preventing external g.user from being shadowed
- Add RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware to __main__.py stdio entry point via
  build_middleware_list() to keep all transports in sync
- Fix stale patch targets in test_tool_search_transform.py: update
  superset.mcp_service.server.user_can_view_data_model_metadata →
  superset.mcp_service.privacy.user_can_view_data_model_metadata
- Qualify write tool listings in instructions with "(requires write access)"
  and add a permissions preamble so read-only users are not confused by
  tools they cannot call

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-13 21:27:57 +00:00
Amin Ghadersohi
9f354519a3 fix(mcp): hide write tools from users without write permissions
Phase 1: MCPPermissionDeniedError falls through to GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware's
generic "Internal error" branch (500-style response) because it doesn't subclass
PermissionError. Fixed by adding it to _USER_ERROR_TYPES and an explicit elif
branch in _handle_error() that converts it to a clean ToolError.

Phase 2: Add RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware that intercepts tools/list and removes
tools the calling user lacks permission to execute. Add
is_tool_visible_to_current_user() to auth.py as the single source of truth for
tool visibility, shared by both the new middleware and the existing tool-search
transform. Register the middleware inside StructuredContentStripperMiddleware so
it filters full tool objects before outputSchema stripping. Fail open: if user
resolution fails, all tools are returned (call-time RBAC still enforces).

Also update server instructions to note write tools require write permissions.
2026-05-13 20:39:56 +00:00
8 changed files with 479 additions and 92 deletions

View File

@@ -47,32 +47,27 @@ from superset.mcp_service.app import init_fastmcp_server, mcp
def _add_default_middlewares() -> None:
"""Add the standard middleware stack to the MCP instance.
This ensures all entry points (stdio, streamable-http, etc.) get
the same protection middlewares that the Flask CLI and server.py add.
Order is innermost → outermost (last-added wraps everything).
"""
from superset.mcp_service.middleware import (
create_response_size_guard_middleware,
GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware,
LoggingMiddleware,
StructuredContentStripperMiddleware,
)
Delegates to ``server.build_middleware_list()`` for the core stack so
the stdio entry point stays in sync with the HTTP server without
duplicating middleware ordering. The optional response size guard is
appended separately (innermost position, same as in run_server()).
# Response size guard (innermost among these)
FastMCP wraps handlers so that the FIRST-added middleware is outermost.
``build_middleware_list()`` already returns middlewares in the correct
outermost-first order.
"""
from superset.mcp_service.middleware import create_response_size_guard_middleware
from superset.mcp_service.server import build_middleware_list
for middleware in build_middleware_list():
mcp.add_middleware(middleware)
# Response size guard is innermost (added last)
if size_guard := create_response_size_guard_middleware():
mcp.add_middleware(size_guard)
limit = size_guard.token_limit
sys.stderr.write(f"[MCP] Response size guard enabled (token_limit={limit})\n")
# Logging
mcp.add_middleware(LoggingMiddleware())
# Global error handler
mcp.add_middleware(GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware())
# Structured content stripper (must be outermost)
mcp.add_middleware(StructuredContentStripperMiddleware())
def main() -> None:
"""

View File

@@ -46,13 +46,19 @@ You are connected to the {branding} MCP (Model Context Protocol) service.
This service provides programmatic access to {branding} dashboards, charts, datasets,
SQL Lab, and instance metadata via a comprehensive set of tools.
Available tools:
IMPORTANT - Permission-based tool availability:
Available tools vary based on your access level. Write operations (generating charts,
dashboards, or datasets; saving SQL queries; executing SQL) require write permissions.
If a write tool does not appear in the tool list, the current user lacks the necessary
access — do NOT attempt to call it. Read-only users will only see read tools.
Tool capabilities (subject to your access level):
Dashboard Management:
- list_dashboards: List dashboards with advanced filters (1-based pagination)
- get_dashboard_info: Get detailed dashboard information by ID
- generate_dashboard: Create a dashboard from chart IDs
- add_chart_to_existing_dashboard: Add a chart to an existing dashboard
- generate_dashboard: Create a dashboard from chart IDs (requires write access)
- add_chart_to_existing_dashboard: Add a chart to an existing dashboard (requires write access)
Database Connections:
- list_databases: List database connections with advanced filters (1-based pagination)
@@ -61,7 +67,7 @@ Database Connections:
Dataset Management:
- list_datasets: List datasets with advanced filters (1-based pagination)
- get_dataset_info: Get detailed dataset information by ID (includes columns/metrics)
- create_virtual_dataset: Save a SQL query as a virtual dataset for charting
- create_virtual_dataset: Save a SQL query as a virtual dataset for charting (requires write access)
- query_dataset: Query a dataset using its semantic layer (saved metrics, dimensions, filters) without needing a saved chart
Chart Management:
@@ -70,14 +76,14 @@ Chart Management:
- get_chart_preview: Get a visual preview of a chart as formatted content or URL
- get_chart_data: Get underlying chart data in text-friendly format
- get_chart_sql: Get the rendered SQL query for a chart (without executing it)
- generate_chart: Create and save a new chart permanently
- generate_chart: Create and save a new chart permanently (requires write access)
- generate_explore_link: Create an interactive explore URL (preferred for exploration)
- update_chart: Update existing saved chart configuration
- update_chart_preview: Update cached chart preview without saving
- update_chart: Update existing saved chart configuration (requires write access)
- update_chart_preview: Update cached chart preview without saving (requires write access)
SQL Lab Integration:
- execute_sql: Execute SQL queries and get results (requires database_id)
- save_sql_query: Save a SQL query to Saved Queries list
- execute_sql: Execute SQL queries and get results (requires database_id and SQL access)
- save_sql_query: Save a SQL query to Saved Queries list (requires write access)
- open_sql_lab_with_context: Generate SQL Lab URL with pre-filled sql
Schema Discovery:
@@ -295,6 +301,10 @@ Permission Awareness:
- get_instance_info returns current_user.roles (e.g., ["Admin"], ["Alpha"], ["Viewer"]).
- ALWAYS check the user's roles BEFORE suggesting write operations (creating datasets,
charts, dashboards, or running SQL).
- Write tools (generate_chart, generate_dashboard, update_chart, create_virtual_dataset,
save_sql_query, add_chart_to_existing_dashboard, update_chart_preview) require write
permissions. These tools are only listed for users who have the necessary access.
If a write tool does not appear in the tool list, the current user lacks write access.
- Do NOT disclose dashboard access lists, dashboard owners, chart owners, dataset
owners, workspace admins, or other users' names, usernames, email addresses,
contact details, roles, admin status, ownership, or access-list information.

View File

@@ -145,6 +145,56 @@ def check_tool_permission(func: Callable[..., Any]) -> bool:
return False
def is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool: Any) -> bool:
"""Return whether the current user can see a tool in tools/list.
Checks both RBAC permissions and data-model metadata privacy. The caller
must set ``g.user`` before calling this function.
This is the single source of truth for tool visibility — called from both
``RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware`` (``tools/list``) and
``_tool_allowed_for_current_user()`` (tool search).
Args:
tool: A FastMCP Tool object.
Returns:
True if the tool is visible to the current user, False otherwise.
"""
try:
from flask import current_app
if not current_app.config.get("MCP_RBAC_ENABLED", True):
return True
tool_func = getattr(tool, "fn", None)
if tool_func is None:
return True
from superset.mcp_service.privacy import (
tool_requires_data_model_metadata_access,
user_can_view_data_model_metadata,
)
if (
tool_requires_data_model_metadata_access(tool_func)
and not user_can_view_data_model_metadata()
):
return False
class_permission_name = getattr(tool_func, CLASS_PERMISSION_ATTR, None)
if not class_permission_name:
return True
return check_tool_permission(tool_func)
except (AttributeError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
logger.debug(
"Could not evaluate tool visibility for current user", exc_info=True
)
return False
def load_user_with_relationships(
username: str | None = None, email: str | None = None
) -> User | None:
@@ -516,6 +566,39 @@ def _cleanup_session_on_error() -> None:
logger.warning("Error cleaning up session after exception: %s", e)
def _get_app_context_manager() -> AbstractContextManager[None]:
"""Return the right context manager for the current Flask state.
When a request context is present, external middleware (e.g.
Preset's WorkspaceContextMiddleware) has already set ``g.user``
on a per-request app context — reuse it via ``nullcontext()``.
When only a bare app context exists (no request context), push a
**new** app context so concurrent tool calls do not share one ``g``
namespace (which would cause ``g.user`` races under asyncio).
When no context exists at all, push a fresh app context from the
Flask singleton.
This is the single source of truth for context selection — called
from both ``mcp_auth_hook`` (tool execution) and
``RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware`` (tools/list filtering).
"""
import contextlib
from flask import current_app, has_app_context, has_request_context
if has_request_context():
return contextlib.nullcontext()
if has_app_context():
# Push a new context for the CURRENT app (not get_flask_app()
# which may return a different instance in test environments).
return current_app._get_current_object().app_context()
from superset.mcp_service.flask_singleton import get_flask_app
return get_flask_app().app_context()
def mcp_auth_hook(tool_func: F) -> F: # noqa: C901
"""
Authentication and authorization decorator for MCP tools.
@@ -530,42 +613,10 @@ def mcp_auth_hook(tool_func: F) -> F: # noqa: C901
Supports both sync and async tool functions.
"""
import contextlib
import functools
import inspect
import types
from flask import current_app, has_app_context, has_request_context
def _get_app_context_manager() -> AbstractContextManager[None]:
"""Push a fresh app context unless a request context is active.
When a request context is present, external middleware (e.g.
Preset's WorkspaceContextMiddleware) has already set ``g.user``
on a per-request app context — reuse it via ``nullcontext()``.
When only a bare app context exists (no request context), we must
push a **new** app context. The MCP server typically runs inside
a long-lived app context (e.g. ``__main__.py`` wraps
``mcp.run()`` in ``app.app_context()``). When FastMCP dispatches
concurrent tool calls via ``asyncio.create_task()``, each task
inherits the parent's ``ContextVar`` *value* — a reference to the
**same** ``AppContext`` object. Without a fresh push, all tasks
share one ``g`` namespace and concurrent ``g.user`` mutations
race: one user's identity can overwrite another's before
``get_user_id()`` runs during the SQLAlchemy INSERT flush,
attributing the created asset to the wrong user.
"""
if has_request_context():
return contextlib.nullcontext()
if has_app_context():
# Push a new context for the CURRENT app (not get_flask_app()
# which may return a different instance in test environments).
return current_app._get_current_object().app_context()
from superset.mcp_service.flask_singleton import get_flask_app
return get_flask_app().app_context()
is_async = inspect.iscoroutinefunction(tool_func)
# Detect if the original function expects a ctx: Context parameter.

View File

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ from superset.commands.exceptions import (
)
from superset.exceptions import SupersetException, SupersetSecurityException
from superset.extensions import event_logger
from superset.mcp_service.auth import MCPPermissionDeniedError
from superset.mcp_service.constants import (
DEFAULT_TOKEN_LIMIT,
DEFAULT_WARN_THRESHOLD_PCT,
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ _USER_ERROR_TYPES = (
ToolError,
ValidationError,
PermissionError,
MCPPermissionDeniedError,
ValueError,
FileNotFoundError,
CommandInvalidError,
@@ -393,6 +395,79 @@ class StructuredContentStripperMiddleware(Middleware):
return result
class RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware(Middleware):
"""Filter tools/list response based on current user's RBAC permissions.
Intercepts every ``tools/list`` request and removes tools the calling user
is not permitted to execute. Public tools (no ``class_permission_name``) and
tools whose permission check passes are included; all others are hidden.
Fail-open vs fail-closed behaviour:
- No auth context at all (no Flask context, no auth header, no dev user
configured) → fail open (return all tools). Call-time RBAC enforces.
- Auth was attempted but credentials are invalid (bad API key, dev
username not in DB, etc.) → fail closed (return only public tools,
i.e. those with no ``class_permission_name``).
- Unexpected errors → fail open. Call-time RBAC still enforces.
"""
@staticmethod
def _public_tools_only(tools: list[Tool]) -> list[Tool]:
"""Return only tools that require no class-level permission."""
return [
t
for t in tools
if getattr(getattr(t, "fn", None), "_class_permission_name", None) is None
]
async def on_list_tools(
self,
context: MiddlewareContext[mt.ListToolsRequest],
call_next: CallNext[mt.ListToolsRequest, list[Tool]],
) -> list[Tool]:
tools = await call_next(context)
try:
from flask import g
from superset.mcp_service.auth import (
_get_app_context_manager,
_setup_user_context,
is_tool_visible_to_current_user,
)
with _get_app_context_manager():
try:
user = _setup_user_context()
except ValueError as exc:
if "No authenticated user found" in str(exc):
# No auth source configured at all → fail open
return tools
# Auth was attempted (e.g. MCP_DEV_USERNAME set) but the
# user was not found in the DB → fail closed
logger.warning(
"MCP tool list: credential failure, hiding protected tools: %s",
exc,
)
return self._public_tools_only(tools)
except PermissionError as exc:
# API key present but invalid/expired → fail closed
logger.warning(
"MCP tool list: credential failure, hiding protected tools: %s",
exc,
)
return self._public_tools_only(tools)
if user is None:
return tools # no Flask app context → fail open
g.user = user
return [t for t in tools if is_tool_visible_to_current_user(t)]
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
# Unexpected setup errors (ImportError, etc.) → fail open.
# Call-time RBAC still enforces permissions.
return tools
class GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware(Middleware):
"""
Global error handler middleware that provides consistent error responses
@@ -501,6 +576,9 @@ class GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware(Middleware):
raise ToolError(
f"Invalid request for {tool_name}: {_sanitize_error_for_logging(error)}"
) from error
elif isinstance(error, MCPPermissionDeniedError):
# MCP RBAC permission denied — convert to structured ToolError
raise ToolError(str(error)) from error
elif isinstance(error, (ForbiddenError, SupersetSecurityException)):
# Superset access denied — agent tried a tool it can't use
raise ToolError(

View File

@@ -41,12 +41,9 @@ from superset.mcp_service.middleware import (
create_response_size_guard_middleware,
GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware,
LoggingMiddleware,
RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware,
StructuredContentStripperMiddleware,
)
from superset.mcp_service.privacy import (
tool_requires_data_model_metadata_access,
user_can_view_data_model_metadata,
)
from superset.mcp_service.storage import _create_redis_store
from superset.utils import json
@@ -403,38 +400,20 @@ def _build_summary_serializer(max_desc: int) -> Any:
def _tool_allowed_for_current_user(tool: Any) -> bool:
"""Return whether the current Flask user can see this tool in search results."""
try:
from flask import current_app, g
from flask import g
if not current_app.config.get("MCP_RBAC_ENABLED", True):
return True
from superset import security_manager
from superset.mcp_service.auth import (
CLASS_PERMISSION_ATTR,
get_user_from_request,
METHOD_PERMISSION_ATTR,
PERMISSION_PREFIX,
is_tool_visible_to_current_user,
)
tool_func = getattr(tool, "fn", None)
if tool_requires_data_model_metadata_access(tool_func) and not (
user_can_view_data_model_metadata()
):
return False
class_permission_name = getattr(tool_func, CLASS_PERMISSION_ATTR, None)
if not class_permission_name:
return True
if not getattr(g, "user", None):
try:
g.user = get_user_from_request()
except ValueError:
return False
method_permission_name = getattr(tool_func, METHOD_PERMISSION_ATTR, "read")
permission_name = f"{PERMISSION_PREFIX}{method_permission_name}"
return security_manager.can_access(permission_name, class_permission_name)
return is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool)
except (AttributeError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
logger.debug("Could not evaluate tool search permission", exc_info=True)
return False
@@ -711,11 +690,15 @@ def build_middleware_list() -> list[Middleware]:
1. StructuredContentStripper — safety net, converts exceptions
to safe ToolResult text for transports that can't encode errors
2. LoggingMiddleware — logs tool calls with success/failure status
3. GlobalErrorHandler — catches tool exceptions, raises ToolError
2. RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware — filters tools/list by RBAC;
positioned inside the Stripper so it sees full tool objects
(with outputSchema) before stripping occurs
3. LoggingMiddleware — logs tool calls with success/failure status
4. GlobalErrorHandler — catches tool exceptions, raises ToolError
"""
return [
StructuredContentStripperMiddleware(),
RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware(),
LoggingMiddleware(),
GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware(),
]

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from flask import g
from superset.mcp_service.auth import (
check_tool_permission,
CLASS_PERMISSION_ATTR,
is_tool_visible_to_current_user,
MCPPermissionDeniedError,
METHOD_PERMISSION_ATTR,
PERMISSION_PREFIX,
@@ -223,3 +224,122 @@ def app_context(app):
"""Provide Flask app context for tests needing g.user."""
with app.app_context():
yield
# -- is_tool_visible_to_current_user --
def _make_mock_tool(
class_perm: str | None = None,
method_perm: str | None = None,
fn: object | None = None,
) -> MagicMock:
"""Create a mock FastMCP Tool object for visibility tests."""
tool = MagicMock()
if fn is not None:
tool.fn = fn
elif class_perm is not None:
func = _make_tool_func(class_perm, method_perm)
tool.fn = func
else:
tool.fn = None
return tool
def test_visibility_returns_true_when_rbac_disabled(app_context, app) -> None:
"""is_tool_visible_to_current_user returns True when RBAC is disabled."""
app.config["MCP_RBAC_ENABLED"] = False
tool = _make_mock_tool(class_perm="Chart", method_perm="write")
try:
assert is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool) is True
finally:
app.config["MCP_RBAC_ENABLED"] = True
def test_visibility_returns_true_when_fn_is_none(app_context) -> None:
"""Tools with fn=None (public/synthetic) are always visible."""
tool = _make_mock_tool()
assert is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool) is True
def test_visibility_public_tool_no_class_permission(app_context) -> None:
"""Tools without class_permission_name are visible to all users."""
g.user = MagicMock(username="viewer")
func = _make_tool_func() # no class permission
tool = MagicMock()
tool.fn = func
assert is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool) is True
def test_visibility_allowed_tool(app_context) -> None:
"""Tools where security_manager grants access are visible."""
g.user = MagicMock(username="admin")
func = _make_tool_func(class_perm="Chart", method_perm="read")
tool = MagicMock()
tool.fn = func
mock_sm = MagicMock()
mock_sm.can_access = MagicMock(return_value=True)
with patch("superset.security_manager", mock_sm):
result = is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool)
assert result is True
def test_visibility_denied_tool(app_context) -> None:
"""Tools where security_manager denies access are hidden."""
g.user = MagicMock(username="viewer")
func = _make_tool_func(class_perm="Dashboard", method_perm="write")
tool = MagicMock()
tool.fn = func
mock_sm = MagicMock()
mock_sm.can_access = MagicMock(return_value=False)
with patch("superset.security_manager", mock_sm):
result = is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool)
assert result is False
def test_visibility_data_model_metadata_denied(app_context) -> None:
"""Tools requiring data-model metadata access are hidden when user lacks it."""
g.user = MagicMock(username="viewer")
func = _make_tool_func(class_perm="Dataset", method_perm="read")
func._requires_data_model_metadata_access = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
tool = MagicMock()
tool.fn = func
mock_sm = MagicMock()
mock_sm.can_access = MagicMock(return_value=True)
with (
patch("superset.security_manager", mock_sm),
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.privacy.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
return_value=False,
),
):
result = is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool)
assert result is False
def test_visibility_data_model_metadata_allowed(app_context) -> None:
"""Tools requiring data-model metadata access are visible when user has it."""
g.user = MagicMock(username="alpha")
func = _make_tool_func(class_perm="Dataset", method_perm="read")
func._requires_data_model_metadata_access = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
tool = MagicMock()
tool.fn = func
mock_sm = MagicMock()
mock_sm.can_access = MagicMock(return_value=True)
with (
patch("superset.security_manager", mock_sm),
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.privacy.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
return_value=True,
),
):
result = is_tool_visible_to_current_user(tool)
assert result is True

View File

@@ -1021,12 +1021,162 @@ class TestGlobalErrorHandlerLogLevels:
error.status = 500
call_next = AsyncMock(side_effect=error)
mock_logger = MagicMock()
with (
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.get_user_id", return_value=1),
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.event_logger"),
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.logger") as mock_logger,
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.logger", mock_logger),
pytest.raises(ToolError, match="Internal error"),
):
await middleware.on_message(context, call_next)
mock_logger.error.assert_called()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_mcp_permission_denied_error_becomes_tool_error(self) -> None:
"""MCPPermissionDeniedError must convert to ToolError, not a generic error."""
from superset.mcp_service.auth import MCPPermissionDeniedError
middleware = GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware()
context = MagicMock()
context.message.name = "generate_dashboard"
context.method = "tools/call"
error = MCPPermissionDeniedError(
permission_name="can_write",
view_name="Dashboard",
user="viewer",
tool_name="generate_dashboard",
)
call_next = AsyncMock(side_effect=error)
with (
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.get_user_id", return_value=42),
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.event_logger"),
pytest.raises(ToolError) as exc_info,
):
await middleware.on_message(context, call_next)
assert "can_write" in str(exc_info.value)
assert "Dashboard" in str(exc_info.value)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_mcp_permission_denied_error_is_user_error(self) -> None:
"""MCPPermissionDeniedError must be classified as a user error (WARNING)."""
from superset.mcp_service.auth import MCPPermissionDeniedError
error = MCPPermissionDeniedError(
permission_name="can_write",
view_name="Chart",
)
assert _is_user_error(error) is True
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_mcp_permission_denied_error_logs_at_warning(self) -> None:
"""MCPPermissionDeniedError should log at WARNING, not ERROR."""
from superset.mcp_service.auth import MCPPermissionDeniedError
middleware = GlobalErrorHandlerMiddleware()
context = MagicMock()
context.message.name = "generate_chart"
context.method = "tools/call"
error = MCPPermissionDeniedError(
permission_name="can_write",
view_name="Chart",
user="reader",
)
call_next = AsyncMock(side_effect=error)
mock_logger = MagicMock()
with (
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.get_user_id", return_value=5),
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.event_logger"),
patch("superset.mcp_service.middleware.logger", mock_logger),
pytest.raises(ToolError),
):
await middleware.on_message(context, call_next)
mock_logger.warning.assert_called()
mock_logger.error.assert_not_called()
class TestRBACToolVisibilityMiddleware:
"""Tests for RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware.on_list_tools."""
def _make_tool(self, name: str = "test_tool") -> Any:
"""Create a minimal mock tool object."""
tool = MagicMock()
tool.name = name
return tool
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fails_open_on_exception(self) -> None:
"""Returns all tools when get_flask_app raises (fail open)."""
from superset.mcp_service.middleware import RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware
tools = [self._make_tool("list_charts"), self._make_tool("generate_chart")]
call_next = AsyncMock(return_value=tools)
middleware = RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware()
with patch(
"superset.mcp_service.flask_singleton.get_flask_app",
side_effect=RuntimeError("no app"),
):
result = await middleware.on_list_tools(MagicMock(), call_next)
assert result == tools
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fails_open_when_user_is_none(self, app) -> None:
"""Returns all tools when _setup_user_context returns None."""
from superset.mcp_service.middleware import RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware
tools = [self._make_tool("list_charts"), self._make_tool("generate_chart")]
call_next = AsyncMock(return_value=tools)
middleware = RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware()
with (
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.flask_singleton.get_flask_app", return_value=app
),
patch("superset.mcp_service.auth._setup_user_context", return_value=None),
):
result = await middleware.on_list_tools(MagicMock(), call_next)
assert result == tools
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_filters_tools_by_rbac(self, app) -> None:
"""Tools denied by is_tool_visible_to_current_user are removed."""
from superset.mcp_service.middleware import RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware
read_tool = self._make_tool("list_charts")
write_tool = self._make_tool("generate_chart")
tools = [read_tool, write_tool]
call_next = AsyncMock(return_value=tools)
middleware = RBACToolVisibilityMiddleware()
mock_user = MagicMock()
def _visible(tool: Any) -> bool:
return tool.name == "list_charts"
with (
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.flask_singleton.get_flask_app", return_value=app
),
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.auth._setup_user_context", return_value=mock_user
),
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.auth.is_tool_visible_to_current_user",
side_effect=_visible,
),
):
result = await middleware.on_list_tools(MagicMock(), call_next)
assert read_tool in result
assert write_tool not in result

View File

@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ def test_tool_search_filter_hides_metadata_tools_without_access() -> None:
with app.app_context():
g.user = SimpleNamespace(username="viewer")
with patch(
"superset.mcp_service.server.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
"superset.mcp_service.privacy.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
return_value=False,
):
result = _filter_tools_by_current_user_permission([metadata, public])
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ def test_tool_search_permission_filter_still_applies_rbac_to_metadata_tools() ->
g.user = SimpleNamespace(username="viewer")
with (
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.server.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
"superset.mcp_service.privacy.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
return_value=True,
),
patch("superset.security_manager", new_callable=Mock) as security_manager,
@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ def test_tool_search_permission_filter_keeps_get_schema_visible_without_metadata
g.user = SimpleNamespace(username="viewer")
with (
patch(
"superset.mcp_service.server.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
"superset.mcp_service.privacy.user_can_view_data_model_metadata",
return_value=False,
),
patch("superset.security_manager", new_callable=Mock) as security_manager,