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* feat(mcp): add OAuth well-known discovery endpoints (RFC 8414 + RFC 9728) Serves /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (RFC 9728) and /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (RFC 8414) so MCP clients can auto-discover the authorization server. Both endpoints are unauthenticated and respect APP_URL for reverse-proxy deployments. * feat(mcp): add dynamic client registration endpoint (RFC 7591) POST /register creates a public Doorkeeper::Application on demand so MCP clients (e.g. Claude.ai) can self-register without manual setup. Validates redirect_uris (including blank entries), falls back to "MCP Client" name, returns no client_secret (public client, PKCE only). Rate-limited to 10 registrations/min/IP via Rack::Attack. * feat(mcp): authenticate via Doorkeeper OAuth2, keep MCP_API_TOKEN as fallback MCP endpoint now accepts OAuth2 Bearer tokens issued by Doorkeeper. Falls back to the existing MCP_API_TOKEN env-var flow so self-hosted deployments are not broken. Requires MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED or MCP_API_TOKEN to be set — the endpoint returns 503 otherwise. - OauthBase concern provides APP_URL-aware configured_base_url (trailing slash stripped to prevent double-slash URLs) - Bearer scheme parsed case-insensitively (RFC 7235) - Only read_write scope accepted — read scope would allow mutating tools (CreateGoal, ImportBankStatement), so read-only tokens are rejected - Deactivated users rejected even with a valid Doorkeeper token - WWW-Authenticate header on 401 points to RFC 9728 resource metadata - SHA-256 digest used for constant-time env-var comparison - Rack::Attack throttle added for POST /register - Routes wired: /.well-known/*, /register, use_doorkeeper * fix(mcp): disable Turbo on OAuth consent form for external redirect URIs Turbo was intercepting the authorization form POST and XHR-fetching the redirect_uri (e.g. https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback), which CORS blocks. Extend the existing turbo_disabled guard to cover any redirect_uri that doesn't originate from the app itself. * feat(mcp): add Settings::McpController with connected clients view - Settings > MCP page (under Advanced) shows the MCP server URL with copy button and step-by-step instructions for connecting Claude.ai - Lists active non-mobile OAuth tokens with app name and revoke action; mobile device tokens are excluded to prevent accidental disconnection - Removes the MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED env-var gate — OAuth auth is always available since Doorkeeper handles consent; MCP_API_TOKEN remains as a self-hosted fallback * fix(mcp): remove client_credentials from grant_types_supported metadata Only authorization_code is supported by the registration endpoint. Advertising client_credentials was misleading — a client that reads the metadata and attempts that flow would get an application with the wrong grant type.
89 lines
2.9 KiB
Ruby
89 lines
2.9 KiB
Ruby
# frozen_string_literal: true
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class Rack::Attack
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# Enable Rack::Attack only in production and staging (disable in test/development to avoid rate-limit flakiness)
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enabled = Rails.env.production? || Rails.env.staging?
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self.enabled = enabled
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# Throttle requests to the OAuth token endpoint
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throttle("oauth/token", limit: 10, period: 1.minute) do |request|
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request.ip if request.path == "/oauth/token"
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end
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throttle("oauth/register", limit: 10, period: 1.minute) do |request|
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request.ip if request.post? && request.path == "/register"
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end
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# Throttle unauthenticated WebAuthn MFA ceremonies similarly to sign-in
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# endpoints; registration remains behind normal application authentication.
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throttle("mfa/webauthn", limit: 10, period: 1.minute) do |request|
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if request.post? && request.path.in?(%w[/mfa/webauthn_options /mfa/verify_webauthn])
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request.ip
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end
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end
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# Throttle admin endpoints to prevent brute-force attacks
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# More restrictive than general API limits since admin access is sensitive
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throttle("admin/ip", limit: 10, period: 1.minute) do |request|
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request.ip if request.path.start_with?("/admin/")
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end
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# Determine limits based on self-hosted mode
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self_hosted = Rails.application.config.app_mode.self_hosted?
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# Throttle API requests per access token
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throttle("api/requests", limit: self_hosted ? 10_000 : 100, period: 1.hour) do |request|
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if request.path.start_with?("/api/")
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# Extract access token from Authorization header
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auth_header = request.get_header("HTTP_AUTHORIZATION")
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if auth_header&.start_with?("Bearer ")
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token = auth_header.delete_prefix("Bearer ").strip # pipelock:ignore
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"api_token:#{Digest::SHA256.hexdigest(token)}"
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else
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# Fall back to IP-based limiting for unauthenticated requests
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"api_ip:#{request.ip}"
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end
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end
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end
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# More permissive throttling for API requests by IP (for development/testing)
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throttle("api/ip", limit: self_hosted ? 20_000 : 200, period: 1.hour) do |request|
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request.ip if request.path.start_with?("/api/")
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end
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# Block requests that appear to be malicious
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blocklist("block malicious requests") do |request|
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# Block requests with suspicious user agents
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suspicious_user_agents = [
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/sqlmap/i,
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/nmap/i,
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/nikto/i,
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/masscan/i
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]
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user_agent = request.user_agent
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suspicious_user_agents.any? { |pattern| user_agent =~ pattern } if user_agent
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end
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# Configure response for throttled requests
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self.throttled_responder = lambda do |request|
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[
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429, # status
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{
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"Content-Type" => "application/json",
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"Retry-After" => "60"
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},
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[ { error: "Rate limit exceeded. Try again later." }.to_json ]
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]
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end
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# Configure response for blocked requests
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self.blocklisted_responder = lambda do |request|
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[
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403, # status
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{ "Content-Type" => "application/json" },
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[ { error: "Request blocked." }.to_json ]
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]
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end
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end
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